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Abstract 
 
Ecosystem provides humans with essential services such as nutrient cycling and stability of 
climate and disease; at the same time some creatures, such as bears and bugs, encroach into a 
city and harm human lives. While conserving these creatures contributes to biodiversity and 
the provision of ecosystem services, humans might need to exterminate them when they 
enter the city. In this trade-off, distance between humans and wildlife creatures matters. 
I develop a model that considers a continuously-variable spatial land use of humans and 
wildlife with three species forming a food-chain (carnivores, herbivores, and plants) in a 
monocentric city adjacent to natural habitats. I permit only carnivores to enter the city. Under 
the situation, I define an equilibrium and prove that one uniquely exists. In the city, 
carnivores spend time so as to balance benefits of getting foods against costs of being 
exterminated by humans. In the habitat, herbivores spend same time at different locations 
even if plant densities vary across the habitat, but carnivores spend different time at different 
locations depending on plant densities. I show one example of the equilibrium land use map. 
Then, I analyze how such equilibrium land use deviates from the first-best social 
optimum in which a social planner can control every endogenous variable including wildlife 
behavior. The equilibrium land use of residents and wildlife creatures is inefficient at each 
location within not only the city but also the habitat.  
It must be, however, impossible to achieve the first-best optimum because animals do not 
follow humans’ law. I thus study the second-best optimal land use policies, taking residents 
and wildlife behavior as given. The land use policies I focus are on the urban boundary 
regulation that restricts the city size and the plant density control that affects the wildlife 
behavior. I theoretically obtain that the second-best optimal city size can be larger or smaller 
than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size, unlike the result of Eichner and Pethig (2006).  
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In numerical simulations, I find that (i) the optimal city size tends to be larger than the 
equilibrium city size as the human’s fear of encroachment by wildlife into the city increases; 
(ii) the combination of the urban boundary regulation and the plant density control is very 
effective. In addition, I study the extermination policy of carnivores as an alternative policy. 
Finally, I apply the model to a real situation in resident–coyote conflict in the Denver 
Metropolitan Area to obtain the second best optimal city size. 
 
Keywords: Land use of residents and wildlife, spatially dependent externalities, 
biodiversity, food chain, urban boundary regulation, plant density control, extermination 
policy.    
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Biodiversity is represented by the number and variety of plants, animals, and other 
organisms, as well as the genetic differences within species. During the last three decades, 
nations worldwide have experienced urban land expansion, reducing the size of the natural 
habitats (Seto et al., 2012). In the United States, for example. long-term housing 
development adversely affects adjacent wilderness areas, which leads to biodiversity loss 
(Pidgeon et al., 2007), and this trend is likely to continue in the future (Radeloff et al., 2010). 
The loss of biodiversity would lower the quality of ecosystem services that are the 
fundamental to sustaining human life on the earth, thus the conservation of biodiversity is 
essential (Cardinale et al., 2012).  
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) reports that ecosystem services can be 
classified into four categories: provisioning services (e.g. food and fresh water), regulating 
services (e.g. climate regulation and disease control), cultural services (e.g. landscape 
aesthetics and recreation), and supporting services (e.g. nutrient cycling and soil formation). 
Weitzman (1992) and Solow et al. (1993) attempt to value the biodiversity based on the 
genetic distance between species. Brock and Xepapadeas (2003) develop a conceptual 
framework for valuing biodiversity in terms of the ecosystem services. 
   On the other hand, there is a growing concern that some species encroach into cities and 
could attack residents and pets (Woodroffe et al., 2005). For example, bears and monkeys in 
Japan attack residents, and foxes in London, and coyotes in Chicago, Los Angeles, Denver, 
and so on in the United States and leopards in India eat domestic animals and sometimes 
attack residents, and bloodsucking mosquitos and mites infect humans.1 According to White 
                                                   
1 According to world’s deadliest animals (the number of people killed by animals) per year (Gates, 2016), 
mosquitoes carrying malaria kill 830,000 humans including children every year and are the deadliest animal on 
earth. The information of the other animals is summarized on the blog of Bill Gates (2016, October 10). 
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and Gehrt, (2009), the frequency of coyote-attacks on residents has gradually increased in 
recent years. 
So, some cities make urban wildlife management plans to tackle with this issue such as 
trapping and even killing. However, we should not exterminate them so easily because they 
are closely connected with other species through a food chain. If top predators or carnivores 
were extinct, plants will be threatened with extinction because of an overabundance of 
herbivores (e.g. Côté et al., 2004). For example, in Japan, an overabundance of deer causes 
serious damage to newly planted seedlings and established trees, which has devastating 
effects on the provisioning of clean water (Ministry of the Environment, 2015).2 Hence, the 
protection or extermination of specific kind of species would cause the loss of biodiversity 
and a deterioration in the quality of ecosystem services. Some countries such as the United 
States, Japan, Sweden, and Norway consider the reintroduction of wolves to areas where 
native wolves have been extirpated to suppress the increase in the number of deer. However, 
it has been controversial because people fear a risk of encountering them and the loss of 
livestock. For the above reason, such human–wildlife conflict is a serious obstacle to 
biological resource conservation. Then, how should we approach to protect human lives as 
well as to preserve biodiversity? 
The encroachment of carnivores generates negative externalities such as injury, 
infectious disease, and, in extreme cases, loss of life. The amount of externality depends on 
locations; namely, it depends on the length of time when human and wildlife coexist in the 
same place, human population densities, and the number of wildlife in urban areas. These 
observations underlie spatially dependent land use policies intended to influence economic 
activity in cities as well as wildlife behavior such as zoning policies to restrict land use and 
                                                   
2 In 100 years ago, deer were killed by humans because they ate farm products. Moreover, deer were 
overhunted during wars. As a consequence, the number of deer were drastically decreased. The Japanese 
government made the protection law to protect deer from overhunting in 1978. In addition, the Japanese 
government exterminated wolves as been dangerous species to humans (Walker, 2009). As a result, the number 
of deer has been increased, which leads to a current problem for the biological resource management. 
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city size, and policies to control plant densities in natural habitats. To design such policies 
effectively, we need a theory of equilibrium land use and a theory of optimal land use that 
consider not only spatial interactions between human and wildlife in residential areas but 
also spatial interactions among wildlife creatures through the food chain in natural habitats. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
Most existing studies about the interaction between humans and wildlife focus on land use 
competition between humans and wildlife, implying how the sizes of both natural habitats 
and lands for human use are endogenously determined (Walker, 2001; Eppink et al., 2004; 
Eichner and Pethig 2006, 2009). They analyze what size of habitat must remain to sustain 
the ecosystem services. Yoshida et al. (2013, 2014a, 2014b) focus on ecosystems and 
humans’ recreational use in sand beaches under sea level rise. They estimate the potential 
impacts of sea level rise on Japanese beaches and derive the optimal size of beaches required 
for conserving ecosystem and using recreational purposes.  
Walker (2001), Eppink et al. (2004), and Yoshida et al. (2014b) represent the change in 
the population of wildlife as a reduced-form function of the habitat size, and the function is 
estimated empirically. However, to design some policies well, we should clarify the 
mechanism behind them. To do that, we have to model complex but important transactions 
between ecosystems and economic activities through the change in the size of habitats and 
lands for human use, as argued by Eichner and Pethig (2009).  
The work of integrating a microfounded ecosystem model with an economic model is 
initiated by Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009). The ecosystem model, which has been 
developed in the ecological literature (e.g. Hannon, 1976; Crocker and Tschirhart, 1992; 
Tschirhart, 2000), uses optimizing behavior to express the behavior of an individual 
organism: the individual organism forages for prey species, while it tries to avoid 
encountering its predators. So, the model can consider predator–prey interactions in the food 
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chain. Eichner and Pethig (2006) show that the optimal city size is smaller than the 
laissez-faire equilibrium city size to increase natural habitats for maintaining the supply of 
ecosystem services to humans.3  
The externalities identified in these previous papers, however, are independent of the 
spatial land use of humans and wildlife. But in a real city, they influence each other, and the 
degrees of their influences depend on their spatial land use. In the model of Eichner and 
Pethig (2006, 2009), the city and the natural habitat are spatially homogeneous, respectively. 
Their model is a two-discrete area model. In addition, the city is just used as a capital for a 
production of composite goods. But in fact, it is mainly used for residential districts, and 
harmful animals encroach into the district. An examination of co-existing humans and 
wildlife requires a distance dimension, which has been absent in the previous models. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
I have three main objectives. First, I develop a model explicitly considering spatial densities 
of land use for humans, carnivores, herbivores, and plants in order to understand spatially 
dependent interactions between humans and wildlife in a city and its impacts on biodiversity. 
Second, I analyze how the laissez-faire equilibrium land use in which humans and wildlife 
coexist in a city gives rise to inefficient outcomes at each location within residential districts 
and natural habitats.  
To attain the first-best optimum, we have to control the animals’ behavior at each 
location. But, that must be impossible because animals do not follow humans’ law. Therefore, 
it is necessary to design the second-best optimal land use policies. The second-best optimal 
land use in cities with transport congestion has been studied in urban economics (Anas and 
Pines, 2012; Anas and Rhee, 2005; Arnott and MacKinnon, 1977; Brueckner, 2007; 
                                                   
3 In the study of Eichner and Pethig (2006), the social planner solves her maximization problem taking the 
individual organism’s behavior as given. So, the social optimum is interpreted as second best optimum.  
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Brueckner and Sridhar, 2012; Buyukeren and Hiramatsu, 2016; Kono et al., 2012; Kono and 
Joshi, in press; Pines and Kono, 2012; Rhee et al., 2014). Recently, Borck (2016) analyzes 
the effect of building size regulations on greenhouse gas emissions. Kono et al. (2017) focus 
on car-related environmental externalities such as air pollution and analyze the efficient level 
of multiple car-related taxes considering marginal costs of public funds. However, the effects 
of land use regulation on the ecosystem in a second-best setting have not yet been taken into 
account.4  
A third objective is thus to derive the second-best optimum condition for land use 
policies that are composed of urban boundary regulation that controls the city size, and the 
plant density control at each location within the natural habitat that affects animals’ foraging 
behavior, in a closed monocentric city with natural habitats. I derive some theoretical 
properties of the optimal land use policies that are different from the results of Eichner and 
Pethig (2006). In addition, I explore how much these land use policies obtain the welfare 
gain through numerical simulations. The results of the second-best policies are also 
summarized in Yoshida and Kono (2017b). 
 
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model that considers a closed 
continuous monocentric city adjacent to a natural habitat with wildlife. Technically, I add a 
continuous distance dimension to the two-discrete-area model of Eichner and Pethig (2006, 
2009), extending the traditional urban economic model (e.g. Alonso, 1964) to have natural 
habitats with animals. To analyze the complexity of ecosystems in the simplest possible way, 
I consider a food chain of three species: plants grow, herbivores feed on plants, and top 
predators (carnivores) feed on herbivores. As in Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009) and the 
                                                   
4 I ignore transport congestion to focus on understanding the interaction between the ecosystem and land use 
policies. 
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related ecological literature, all of the animals behave so as to maximize their net offspring 
for the preservation of their own species. To generate the offspring, the animal searches the 
habitat for prey species, while the animal tries to avoid encountering predators.5 I newly 
define a time density as a population density of wildlife at each location. It indicates the 
per-time length when wildlife is staying in one place. With the new idea, I can model the 
animal behavior as follows: The animal chooses its favorable time density so as to maximize 
its net offspring, taking the other species’ time densities as given, subject to a time constraint. 
Only carnivores go out of the natural habitat and search the city for human-related sources of 
food such as garbage. Then, humans feel disutility from a risk of an encounter with 
carnivores. On the other hand, they benefit from ecosystem services depending on the 
numbers of all species. I employ a traditional dynamic population growth model called as 
Lotka-Volterra model and put the wildlife behavior into the model. This enables us to focus 
on substantial humans–wildlife interactions in a city and their effects on a steady-state 
population equilibrium in the simplest possible framework.6 
Section 3 studies the laissez-faire equilibrium land use. I permit carnivores to enter the 
city, but they feel more risk to exterminate by humans as they approach the city center.  
Under this condition, residents and carnivores co-exist in the part of urban areas, and 
carnivore’s time densities vary across the co-existing areas. I prove that an equilibrium exists 
and is a unique. I construct a land use map showing both residential densities and time 
densities of animals and show how this map is changed by changes in location-dependent 
parameters.  
                                                   
5 In the previous papers (e.g. Eichner and Pethig 2006), the animal is assumed to trade its own biomass in a 
virtual competitive market. But, we do not follow this idea because the time constraint is more natural for 
animals.  
6 In population biology, there are some dynamic models. One is a metapopulation model in which individual 
animals spatially distributed in a habitat in two or more subpopulation. Metapopulation biology studies effects 
of habitat patch, isolation, and colonization on their population dynamics and adaptive evolution. However, the 
purpose of this study is to understand human–wildlife interaction in a city, so I do not model such a complex 
mechanism in a natural habitat. The detailed explanation is given in Hanski (1998). 
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Section 4 defines the first-best optimum and explores characteristics of market failures in 
terms of time densities of animals, residential densities, and a city size (the size of natural 
habitats) by comparing the first-best optimum condition with the equilibrium condition. A 
social welfare function is composed of total utility of households. In the first-best optimum, 
the social planner includes animals’ behavior and transactions in his/her optimization 
problem. Such first-best optimum is usually impractical but ideal because we cannot 
efficiently allocate all natural resources including animals’ behavior. It may be possible for 
humans, however, to change the animals’ behavior at least to some extent by using some 
policies such as food traps to attract animals. The ideal first-best optimization can be used to 
measure how much such policies would improve the social welfare. Main theoretical 
findings are that (i) the land use of wildlife is inefficient at each location within not only 
urban areas but also natural habitats, and (ii) the first-best city size can be larger than the 
equilibrium city size. I numerically simulate the theoretical property to understand how the 
optimal city size is smaller as well as larger than the equilibrium city size depending on 
human–wildlife interactions in terms of conflicts and biodiversity. In addition, I derive social 
values of species and their components. 
Section 5 studies the second-best optimal land use policies in a closed continuous 
monocentric city with natural habitats, taking residents’ and wildlife behavior as given. The 
land use policies I focus are on an urban boundary regulation that controls the city size and 
the plant density control at each location within natural habitats. I obtain that even in the 
second-best settings, the optimal city size can be larger or smaller than the laissez-faire 
equilibrium city size depending on the situation, including the sign of the shadow price of 
herbivores and carnivores. The sign of the shadow price of herbivores and carnivores can be 
either positive or negative depending on the situation such as how much impact the 
carnivore’s stay in cities will have on the human’s utility. In addition, I numerically assess 
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the effectiveness of these policies. Imposing only urban boundary regulation obtains from 
38% to 60% of the first-best welfare gain, but the combination of urban boundary regulation 
and plant density control obtains more than 90% of the first-best welfare gain. This result 
implies that when the city government imposes the urban boundary regulation, higher 
welfare gains can be obtained by optimally adjusting the plant density in the natural habitat. 
These results could not be obtained in the two-discrete-area model of Eichner and Pethig 
(2006). 
Section 6 investigates the social optimal extermination policy. In reality, some cities try 
to exterminate wildlife creatures who enter the city and occur conflicts with humans. As I 
mentioned before, we should not exterminate them so easily because they are closely 
connected with other species through a food chain. So, the question is how many urban 
carnivores we should exterminate in the presence of the food chain. I show the optimal rule 
of exterminating carnivores at each location within the residential area.  
Section 7 focuses on a real situation. I apply the proposed model in this paper to a 
resident–coyote conflict occurred in the Denver Metropolitan Area (DMA). The purpose is 
to measure the overall welfare effect of the urban boundary regulation in DMA in the 
presence of unpriced externalities: the conflict and biodiversity conservation. The result 
indicates that when imposing urban boundary regulations in DMA, there exists a case in 
which even if the humans’ fear of carnivores increases, the value of biodiversity may arise. 
Besides that, the number of plants is sensitively influenced by direct effects of changes in the 
size of natural areas and indirect effects of changes in the number of herbivores through the 
changes in the number of carnivores affected by the urban boundary regulation. The amount 
of these effects varies according to the regulation. Hence, it is necessary to design policies, 
taking that into consideration. 
The final section concludes the paper. 
9 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 City and natural habitats 
Consider a closed monocentric city adjacent to a natural habitat. There are 2 hN   
identical households in the city and the land is equally owned by the city residents.7 For 
simplicity, the population of the city equals the number of households. The city is linear with 
the width of one unity, and the size is defined by [ ,Z ]H Hx Z  , where x denotes a 
locational distance from the city center, and HZ   is an urban boundary. The city is 
symmetric, and the right-hand side (RHS, hereafter) has hN  population. I ignore the 
production of housing and assume that land is directly used by residents. Households do not 
enter the habitat.  
The natural habitat is also symmetric. The RHS has i  species whose populations are 
denoted by 1{ , ,  }
i
iN N  N   . For simplicity, all animals or organisms belonging to the 
same species are assumed to be identical. In order to represent the ecosystem in the simplest 
possible framework, suppose a food-chain of three species (i.e. 3i  ): carnivores (i = 3) 
feed on herbivores (i = 2), herbivores feed on plants (i = 1), and plants take up nutrients that 
can be brought by humans.  
Carnivores and herbivores search the habitat for prey species to generate their offspring. 
They eat prey species when meeting them. Suppose that only carnivores go out of the natural 
habitat up to location [0,  ]HX Z  in the residential area to seek human-origin foods such 
as garbage. X is endogenously determined.  
The land is divided into the following three zones: (i) central business district (CBD) 
( 0x  ), (ii) housing zone (called the human zone) ( [0, ]Hx Z ), and (iii) the natural habitat 
(called the animal zone) ( [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z ), where AZ   is the boundary of the natural 
habitat. Superscript H indicates the human zone, and A indicates the animal zone throughout 
                                                   
7 This is a typical city model, which is referred to as the closed-city model under public landownership (CCP) 
model by Fujita (1989). 
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Figure 1. The model city adjacent to a natural habitat 
 
the paper. Following a real land use pattern, the geographical pattern is assumed as depicted 
in Fig. 1.8 It shows only the RHS of the land, assuming that the left-hand side (LHS, 
hereafter) and RHS are symmetric. I model each agent’s behavior during one year in a steady 
state. 
 
2.2 Ecosystem model  
The representative individual animal or organism of species i, called individual i for short, 
behaves so as to maximize its net offspring (e.g. Eichner and Pethig, 2006, 2009), which is 
essential for the continued existence of a species. To produce offspring, individual i feeds on 
prey species to take in nutrients, while trying to avoid encountering its predator species as 
much as possible. Such instinctive behavior is formalized by the following offspring 
function:  
( ,  ;  )i i i i ib B Q M m ,  (2.1) 
where bi is individual i’s offspring, iQ   is individual i’s intake of prey, iM   is the 
number of predators that individual i may encounter, and im  is a positive parameter 
                                                   
8 In order to focus on the case where carnivores come into the residential district, this model omits the land 
used for agriculture.  
Human zone (Lot size zone) 
 
Herbivores’ search range  
Animal zone (covered by plants) 
 
ZH 
Urban 
boundary 
 
ZA 
Natural habitat  
boundary 
 
 
X 
Boundary of carnivores’ 
search range  
 
 
Carnivores’ search range  
0 
City center 
Width = 1 
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representing individual i’s loss rates due to natural death. As in the traditional ecological 
literature, I replace (2.1) by the Lotka-Volterra-type equation: 
i i i i i ib Q M m    , (2.2) 
where 0i   and 0i   are respectively individual i’s reproduction efficiency per prey 
eaten and breeding time, and 0i   is individual i’s reproduction loss per encounter with 
predators. 
 
2.2.1 Carnivore’s behavior 
The representative carnivore searches the animal zone for herbivores and the human zone for 
human-origin foods. In the human zone, the carnivore may encounter 3M  number of people 
and might be killed by people. Thus, the carnivore’s offspring function is given by 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3( )
A Hb Q Q M m     ,  (2.3) 
where 3
AQ  is carnivore’s intake of herbivore, 3
HQ  is carnivore’s intake of human-origin 
foods such as garbage, which is a perfect substitute for 3
AQ , for simplicity. 
Each carnivore preys on herbivores when meeting them. The probability that each 
carnivore meets an herbivore at location x depends on multiplication of carnivore’s time 
density and herbivore’s time density. The time density is formally defined as follows. 
 
Definition 1. Individual i’s time density within zone j, ( )jit x , indicates the length of time 
when individual i is staying at location x within zone j for feeding for one year.  
 
The expected intake of herbivores at location [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z  is expressed by 
3 2 2( ) ( )
A At x t x N , where 3 2( ) ( )
A At x t x  is the probability of an encounter between a carnivore and 
a herbivore at location x. The sum of intake of herbivores per carnivore is given by  
3 3 2 2( ) ( )
A A A
A
H
Z
Z
Q t x t x N dx  .   (2.4) 
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Similarly, the carnivore’s intake of human-origin foods at location [ ,  ]Hx X Z  is 
determined by the carnivore’s time density in the human zone 3 ( )
Ht x  multiplied by the 
density of human-origin foods 3( ( )) ( )
H
h ht x n x , where ( )hn x  is human population density 
and 3 3( ( ))
Ht x  expresses the availability of foods. I assume that 3( ) 0    on 
3 ( ) [0,  1]
Ht x   to avoid that the carnivore’s intake of human-origin foods is negative value 
and that 3( ) 0    and 3( ) 0   , implying that the more foods the carnivores eat, the more 
difficult it is to obtain new foods at the location. The sum of intake of human-origin foods is 
expressed by 
3 3 3 3( ) ( ( )) ( )
H H H
h
HZ
X
Q t x t x n x dx  .  (2.5) 
The expected number of people that the carnivore may encounter depends on  
3 3 ( ) ( ) ( )
H
h
HZ
X
M t x x n x dx  ,  (2.6) 
where ( )x  is a parameter that explains the humans’ chance to encounter carnivores. The 
value of the parameter increases as it gets close to the CBD (i.e. ( ) 0x   ). It implies that 
when carnivores walk to the CBD, the closer to the CBD the more they have chances to meet 
humans. The time constraint for each carnivore is given by 
 
3 3( ) ( )
A H
A H
H
Z Z
Z X
T t x dx t x dx   ,  (2.7) 
where T  is one year, 3 ( )
A
A
H
Z
Z
t x dx  is the time spent searching in the animal zone, and 
3 ( )
H
HZ
X
t x dx  is the time spent searching in the human zone. The carnivore maximizes 
function (2.3) subject to (2.4)–(2.7) by controlling 3 3 3 3 3,  ,  ,  ,  ( ) and ( )
A H A HQ Q M X t x t x . 
Closer to the CBD, the availability of food increases because of an increase in population 
density, whereas the risk of being killed by people increases as the time spent in the human 
zone increases. Carnivores determine their search boundary X by equalizing the marginal 
benefit with respect to distance to the marginal cost with respect to distance. I focus on the 
case where [0,  ]HX Z  implying that I assume that ( )x  is determined so that X lies on 
[0,  ]HZ . 
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2.2.2 Herbivore’s behavior  
The representative herbivore searches the animal zone for plants, but may encounter 2M  
number of carnivores and might be eaten by them. Thus, the herbivore’s offspring function is 
2 2 2 2 2 2b Q M m    .  (2.8) 
 The herbivore’s intake of plants at location [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z  is the product of 2 ( )
At x  and 
the density of plants 1 ( )n x . The total intake of plants is expressed by  
2 2 2 2 1( ) ( ( )) ( )
A A
A
H
Z
Z
Q t x t x n x dx  ,  (2.9) 
where 2 2( ( ))
At x  expresses the availability of foods. I also assume that 2 ( ) 0    and 
2 ( ) 0   , implying that the more food the carnivores eat, the more difficult it is to obtain 
new foods at the location. In addition, I assume 2 ( ) 0    on 2 ( ) [0,  1]At x   because the 
sum of intake of foods is nonnegative value. The herbivore’s expected probability of death is 
given by9  
2 2 3 3( ) ( )
A A
A
H
Z
Z
M t x t x N dx  .   (2.10) 
Summing this over the whole species, the expected loss of herbivore biomass is 2 2N M . The 
time constraint for each herbivore is expressed by 
2 ( )
A
A
H
Z
Z
T t x dx  ,   (2.11) 
where 2 ( )
A
A
H
Z
Z
t x dx  is the time spent searching in the animal zone. The herbivore maximizes 
function (2.8) subject to (2.9)–(2.11) by controlling 2 2 2,  ,  and ( )
AQ M t x . The Lagrangian 
function expressing market equilibrium of both carnivores and herbivores and its first order 
conditions are found in Appendix 3-A.  
 
2.3 Household behavior  
Each household resides at location [0, ]Hx Z . They commute to the CBD where all firms 
are located and earn exogenous wage w. As carnivores search the human zone for foods, 
                                                   
9 In a market equilibrium, N3Q3A = N2M2. 
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households may encounter carnivores. The number of carnivores that each household may 
encounter is denoted by ( )hM x , which implies the risk of being killed by carnivores:  
3 3( ) ( )
H
hM x t x N .  (2.12) 
The household spends money on commuting, housing and composite goods. The 
household’s utility increases with the quality of ecosystem services. The quality is 
determined by the population of all species according to the function ( )e E N . I assume 
that the partial derivative of function e with respect to N is positive. The household’s utility 
function is  
    ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ( )h hv x U C x f x g M x E   N ,   (2.13) 
where ( )C x  is the consumption of numeraire composite goods, and ( )f x is the housing lot 
size. Marginal utilities with respect to C(x) and f (x) are assumed to be positive, and 
 ( ) 0hg M x  . The income constraint is given by   
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w A C x r x f x x      ,    (2.14) 
where   is the per-resident revenue from land ownership, ( )r x  is the land rent at 
location x, ( )x  is the commuting cost depending on distance from the CBD, and A  is 
per-resident costs for maintaining the desired density of plants.10   should be equal to or 
less than per-capita land rent revenue,11 i.e.,  
 
0
[ ( ) ]h H
HZ
N r x r dx  ,   (2.15) 
where Hr  is the cost of housing land development, that is, the cost of land conversion from 
natural habitats to residential areas. I assume that 0Hr   to avoid (Z )Hf   . 
 
                                                   
10 Total cost for maintenance of plants is assumed to be incurred by all households. 
11 Inequality implies that residents can refuse the receipt of the land revenue. However, as long as per-capita 
land revenue has a positive utility, equality holds in (2.15). This inequality is useful to derive the sign of the 
Lagrange multiplier for this constraint, simply using the Kuhn-Tucker condition. The same treatment with the 
same objective is shown in Kono and Kawaguchi (2016) and Kono and Joshi (2017). 
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2.4 Market clearing conditions and definitions 
The populations of carnivores and herbivores are determined by predator–prey interactions. 
Since bi is individual i’s offspring produced in one year, the dynamics of population change 
is described by the following differential equations: 
,i i i
dN N b
dt
  i = 2, 3         (2.16) 
Substituting (2.3) and (2.8) into the differential equations yields  
                      3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3( )
HdN PN Q N M N m N
dt
           (2.17) 
2
2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 ,
dN Q N PN N m N
dt
      (2.18) 
where  
                             2 3( ) ( )
A A
A
H
Z
Z
P t x t x dx  ,  (2.19) 
implying the probability of an encounter between a carnivore and a herbivore in the natural 
area. Population equilibrium is steady in the model when neither of the populations is 
changing. The current paper assumes that neither species is extinct. N3 and N2 in a steady 
state are derived from (2.17) and (2.18) with 3 2 0dN dt dN dt  : 
2 2 2
3
2
,Q mN
P


   (2.20) 
3 3 3 3 3
2
3
HM Q mN
P
 

  .   (2.21) 
At location [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z , plants grow during one year and are eaten by herbivores. 
Humans can control the number of plants by putting nutrients into the land or directly 
planting or cutting plants. The number of herbivores eating plants at location x depends on 
2 ( )
At x  times 2N . In a steady state, the plant density at location x is  
1 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
An x x a x t x N    , (2.22) 
where 1( )x  is the number of plants at location x that grows naturally without being 
planted by humans, ( )a x  is the number of plants planted or cut by humans, and 1  is a 
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parameter. The total amount of plants is calculated by integrating the plant density over the 
animal zone:  
1 1( )
A
H
Z
Z
N n x dx  .  (2.23) 
The humans’ aggregate payment for controlling plant density is given by  
( ) h
A
H
Z
Z
pa x dx N A ,      (2.24) 
where p is the price per nutrient.  
The constraints on the carnivore’s probability of succeeding in feeding on one herbivore 
at each location is obtained by differentiating (2.19) with respect to distance:  
2 3( ) ( ) ( )
A AP x t x t x  .  (2.25) 
A dot on a variable, hereafter, denotes derivative of each variable with respect to distance. 
Likewise, (2.26)–(2.28) are the constraints on carnivore’s and herbivore’s intake of foods at 
each location and the number of people that carnivores may encounter at each location, 
respectively. They are obtained by differentiating (2.5), (2.6) and (2.9) with respect to 
distance:  
3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
H H H
hQ x t x t x n x  ,  (2.26) 
2 2 2 2 1( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
A AQ x t x t x n x  ,  (2.27) 
3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
H
hM x t x x n x  .  (2.28) 
Next, (2.29) implies that the household’s utility will be common across locations because 
households can migrate for free:12  
( ) ,  [0,  ]Hv x V x Z   .  (2.29) 
Households at location x consume ( )f x  area of lot; therefore, total lot consumed at each 
location equals the unit land area supplied:  
( ) ( ) 1hn x f x  .  (2.30) 
(2.31) indicates that the total city population hN  equals households’ population:  
                                                   
12 The inquality condition implies that the household must receive the utility level V. 
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0
( )h h
HZ
N n x dx  .  (2.31) 
At the market equilibrium, the urban boundary is determined at which  
( )H Hr Z r .  (2.32) 
We assume that 0Hr   to avoid the lot housing size is infinite at the urban boundary. In this 
setting an allocation will mean a collection of ( ( )f x , ( )hn x , ( )r x , ( )hM x , 3 ( )
Ht x , 3 ( )
At x , 
2 ( )
At x ) on [0, ZA] and ( 3
HQ , 3
AQ , 3,M  2M , 2 ,Q  3,N  2 ,N  1N , V,  , ZH) that satisfies 
(2.4)–(2.6), (2.9)–(2.10), (2.12), (2.15), and (2.19)–(2.32).  
Endogenous and exogenous variables for each agent are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Endogenous and exogenous variables for each agent 
 External variables for each agent 
 Population Population 
Density 
Per capita 
income 
Urban 
boundary  
Number of 
native plants  
Planted or weeded 
plants by humans 
Humans hN  nh(x) w ZH   
Plants N1 n1(x)   1( )x  a(x) 
Herbivores N2      
Carnivores N3      
  
 Choice variables for each agent 
 Utility / Net offspring 
Composite 
goods / Intake 
of foods  
Number of 
predators  
Lot housing 
size /  
Time density 
Boundary 
of search 
range 
Land 
rent 
Humans  v(x) C(x) Mh(x) f (x)  r(x) 
Herbivores b2 Q2 M2 t2
A
(x)   
Carnivores 
 (natural habitats) b3 Q3
A  t3
A
(x)   
(residential area)  Q3
H M3 t3
H
(x) X  
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3. Laissez-faire equilibrium   
3.1 Equilibrium conditions  
At the laissez-faire market equilibrium, the human population density is determined as a 
result of competition for housing location among residents. ( )r x  equals the maximum rent 
bid by a household as a result of competition among residents. Mathematically, such bid-rent 
behavior is formalized as follows: 
 
( ), ( )
( ) ( )max ( )
( )C x f x
w A x C xr x
f x
        s.t. (2.13)  (3.1) 
Solving utility function (2.13) for C(x) using utility level ( )v x V  yields 
 ( ) ( ( ) ( ) , ( ))hC x C V E g M x f x  N . Then, substituting this into the bid rent 
maximization problem yields 
 
( )
( ) ( ( ) ( ) , ( ))
max ( )
( )
h
f x
w A x C V E g M x f x
r x
f x
      

N
 
The first order condition with respect to ( )f x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z , taking the carnivore’s 
time density 3 ( )
Ht x  as given, is  
 ( ) ( ( ) ( ) , ( ))
0
( )
hw A x C V E g M x f x C
f x f
         

N
.  (3.2) 
Solving (3.2) for ( )f x  yields  
 ( ) ( ), ( )f x f G x I x ,  (3.3) 
and substituting it into the objective function yields 
 ( ) ( ), ( )r x r G x I x , (3.4) 
where  ( ) ( ) ( )hG x V g M x E   N  and ( ) ( )I x w A x   . 
Next, I show the land use of animals (i.e. the time density of animals) at the equilibrium. 
From Appendix 3-B, we can obtain the equilibrium conditions with respect to 3 ( )
Ht x  at any 
[ ,  ]Hx X Z  and to  t3
A(x)  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z , taking  nh(x)  and 2 ( )
At x  as given: 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
H H H
h h ht x n x t x t x n x x n x          ,      (3.5) 
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    3 2 2 3( ) 0
At x N   .                      (3.6) 
The first term in (3.5) indicates a marginal increase in the carnivore’s intake of food when 
3 ( )
Ht x  increases marginally (i.e. Marginal benefit). The second term is a marginal decrease 
in the additional food that the carnivores can eat in the next time period (e.g., one hour). The 
third term is a marginal increase in the carnivore’s probability of encounter with humans, i.e., 
the marginal increase in the risk of being killed by humans. The fourth term is the Lagrange 
multiplier of the time constraint. The second, third, and fourth terms indicate marginal costs.  
The first term in (3.6) indicates that the marginal increase in the carnivore’s intake of 
herbivores when 3 ( )
At x  increases marginally. Carnivores can eat the herbivores without any 
risk in the natural habitat. So, the fourth term in (3.5) corresponds with the decrease in the 
consumption of herbivores in the natural habitat. At x in the city [ , ]H AZ Z , 3 ( )Ht x  is 
determined so that the marginal benefit equals marginal cost. I will theoretically show how 
3 ( )
Ht x  changes as x approaches to the CBD in subsection 3.3. Similarly, we can obtain the 
equilibrium conditions with respect to 2 ( )
At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z , taking 3 ( )
At x  as given: 
              2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.
A A A An x t x n x t x t x t x N            (3.7) 
Each term indicates the same as the corresponding term in (3.5).  
 
3.2 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium allocation  
In this subsection I show that there exists a unique equilibrium allocation that satisfies the 
equilibrium conditions defined in section 2. I first show that there exists a unique 
equilibrium land use in which carnivores stay in both the city and the natural habitat and 
herbivores stay in the natural habitat. All other endogenous variables are uniquely 
determined by the unique equilibrium land use, even if any equilibrium land use are 
determined, using market cleaning conditions and definitions defined in Section 2. So unique 
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equilibrium land use determines the allocation uniquely. This conclusion is stated at the end 
of this subsection as Theorem 1.  
I have four steps to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium land use. First, I show that given 
the land use at all other locations and utility level V, there is a unique Nash equilibrium of 
housing size and the carnivore’s time density at any x in the city. Second, I show that there is 
a unique path for both housing size and the carnivore’s time density on [ ,  ]HX Z . Third, I 
show that there is a unique path of the time density of both herbivores and carnivores in the 
natural habitat. Finally, I show that the equilibrium utility level V is determined uniquely. 
With these steps, there is one equilibrium land use satisfying equilibrium conditions (3.2) 
and (3.5)–(3.7). The proofs of Lemma 1, 2, and 3 are can be found in Appendix 3-C. 
I start the first step. Consider any [0, ]Hx Z . Solving (3.2) for housing size ( )f x  is 
the resident’s best response function to the carnivore’s time density 3 ( )
Ht x : 
3( ) ( ( ))
H
resf x R t x .  
 
Lemma 1. 3( ( ))
H
resR t x  is monotonically increasing in 3 ( )
Ht x  on [0, 1]. 
 
This result is intuitive. When 3 ( )
Ht x  increases, implying that the resident’s fear of 
encountering carnivores (disutility) increases, the land rent is decreased, and f increases to 
keep the equilibrium utility level. In contrast, when 3 ( ) 0
Ht x  , the rent equals to the rent at 
the location where there is no externality of encroachment by carnivores; f is uniquely 
determined by the commuting cost. 
I now turn to the carnivore’s best response function for ( )f x : 3 ( ) ( ( ))
H
cart x R f x . 
Substituting (3.6) into (3.5) with (2.30) yields  
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
1 1[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
H H H A
h ht x n x t x t x n x x t x Nf x f x
          .  (3.8) 
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Solving (3.8) for housing size ( )f x  is the resident’s best response function to the 
carnivore’s time density 3 ( )
Ht x : 3 ( ) ( ( ))
H
cart x R f x . 
 
Lemma 2. ( ( ))carR f x  is monotonically decreasing in ( )f x . 
 
This is not intuitive results because as ( )f x  decreases (i.e. human population density 
increases), not only the marginal benefit of getting foods increases but also the marginal cost 
of encountering humans increases. Thus the carnivore’s time density seems to either increase 
or decrease. An intuitive reason why this is not the case is as follows. The location where the 
first order condition with respect to 3 ( )
Ht x  is satisfied is the location where carnivores 
would like to go for foods, even though they can get foods without risk in natural habitats. In 
other words, the marginal benefit is always larger than the marginal cost as human 
population density increases. Therefore, the larger the population density, the more foods the 
carnivore can get, implying that 3 ( )
Ht x  increases as ( )f x  decreases. Finally, the time 
density of carnivores is binding upper bound: 3 ( ) 1
Ht x   (that is point D on Figure 2). In 
contrast, there exists one human population density in which the time density of carnivores is 
binding lower bound 3 ( ) 0
Ht x  , which implies that the carnivores cannot get any foods 
even if they stay, because the human population density is low and thus there is no garbage 
there (that is point A on Figure 2). This implies that the more time the carnivore stays, the 
less food the carnivore eats in natural habitats. Obviously, 3 ( ) 0
Ht x   when human 
population density is zero.  
   I illustrate these best response functions of carnivores and residents as Figure 2. There 
exists two kinds of corner solutions depending on parameters or kinds of species: (i) Point A 
can be smaller than point B; (ii) point C can be lower than point D. The case (i) occurs when 
the commuting cost is high because the housing lot size becomes large. The case (i) also 
occurs if humans are eager to exterminate the harmful carnivores and/or the carnivores’  
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Figure 2. Best response functions of carnivores and humans at any [0, ]Hx Z . 
 
availability of food is quite low. Then, the curve A-D is shift leftwards. So, point A can be 
smaller than point B. In this case, the time density of carnivore is zero and the housing lot 
size is determined by only commuting costs. The case (ii) occurs when wildlife creatures are 
less dangerous to humans. Then, the housing lot size is not affected by the time density of 
carnivores (i.e. it is inelastic). So, point C comes down, and point C can be lower than point 
D. In this case, the time density of carnivores is one, implying that carnivores spend all the 
time at x within the city. In contrast, the more dangerous wildlife creatures are, point C 
becomes larger. In an extreme case, no one lives in a place where a brown bear is staying for 
a long time．Except for above two kinds of corner solutions, there exists one inner solution.   
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, I proved that given the land use at all other locations and 
utility level V, there is a Nash equilibrium of housing size ( )f x  and carnivore’s time 
density 3 ( )
Ht x  at any [ , ]Hx X Z  in the city. Next, we show the equilibrium ( )f x  and 
3 ( )
Ht x  are continuous on [ , ]HX Z . To prove that, I apply the implicit function theorem to a 
system of (3.2) and (3.8) with respect to all [ , ]Hx X Z .  
 
Lemma 3. There is a unique equilibrium path of both ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x  on [ , ]HX Z .  
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This result is intuitive. Since distance x is smooth, the housing size and the time density of 
carnivores are a smooth function of x.  
Finally, we consider the equilibrium path of the time density of both carnivores and 
herbivores within natural areas: 3 ( )
At x  and 2 ( )
At x . From Appendix 3-B, 2 ( )
A
A H
Tt x
Z Z


.  
Since lot housing size is monotonically increasing in x from Appendix 3-C: ( ) 0df x
dx
 , the 
urban boundary ZH is uniquely determined. So, 2 ( )
At x  is unique at all [ , ]H Ax Z Z . Next, I 
consider 3 ( )
At x . Solving the first order condition with respect to the time density of 
herbivore (3.7) for 3 ( )
At x  with 1 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )
An x x t x N    yields13  
 
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3
2 3
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
( )
A A A A
A
x t x N t x t x t x
t x
N
     

          at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z . 
 (3.9) 
From Lemma 3 and the uniqueness of ZH, the carnivore’s total time spent in the natural 
habitat is uniquely determined. Exogenous variable 1( )x (the number of plants that grows 
naturally) is thus only one variable depending on the location. 1( )x  has a unique path on 
[ , ]H AZ Z  and 1( ) 0x   at all [ , ]H Ax Z Z . So, 3 ( )At x  is continuous on [ , ]H AZ Z . 
Combining such carnivore’s total time spent in the natural habitat and (3.9) uniquely 
determines 3 ( )
At x  at all [ , ]H Ax Z Z .  
Finally, we have to investigate the uniqueness of utility level V. V is determined such that 
(2.31) is satisfied; that is,  
( )
0
( , )h h
HZ V
N n V x dx  . (3.10) 
To show the uniqueness of utility level V, it is sufficient to prove that the LHS of (3.10) is 
monotonically changing in V. Unlike the basic urban economics model, this model has 
externalities caused by the encroachment of carnivores into the city. So, we have to consider 
the best response of both residents and carnivores.  
                                                   
13 In the equilibrium, humans do not control the plant density by planting additional plants. So, a(x) = 0. 
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Let ( )V  be the LHS of (3.10). Then,  
 
( )
0
( ) ( )( ( )) 0.
H
H h
h
HZ Vd V dZ V dnn Z V dx
dV dV dV
      (3.11) 
 
The proof of (3.11) is given as follows. From the comparative static analysis of the bid rent 
maximization problem, 0df
dV
 , given 3 ( )
Ht x . This implies that the best response function 
of ( )f x , shown as B-C line in Figure 2, shifts upward. So, we can obtain ( ) 0df x
dV
  at all 
[0,  ]Hx Z . From (2.30), ( , ) 0hdn V x
dV
 . The second term on the LHS of (3.11) is thus 
negative. Since ( ) 0df x
dV
  at all x, the bid rent decreases at all [0,  ]Hx Z . This implies 
that the city size becomes small: ( ) 0
HdZ V
dV
 . The first term on the LHS of (3.11) is thus 
negative. Therefore, I proved that the LHS of (3.10) is monotonically decreasing in V. Thus, 
we can obtain the following. 
 
Lemma 4. There is an equilibrium land use in which carnivores stay in a city and natural 
habitats and herbivores stay in only natural habitats that satisfies conditions (3.2), and 
(3.5)–(3.7). 
 
The equilibrium paths of land use ( ( )f x , 3 ( )
Ht x , 3 ( )
At x , and 2 ( )
At x ) uniquely determine 
all other endogenous variables, even if any equilibrium paths are determined, using 
associated market cleaning conditions and definitions.14 3 ,
HQ  3,M  2 ,Q  3,N 2 ,N  and 1N  
are directly determined by (2.5)–(2.6), (2.9), and (2.19)–(2.23). Substituting N2 into (2.4) 
yields 3
AQ , and substituting N3 into (2.10) yields 2M . ( )hM x  and ( )hn x  are directly 
determined by (2.12) and (2.30). Since ( )f x  is uniquely determined, the land rent r(x) is 
uniquely determined by substituting ( )f x  into objective function of the bid rent 
                                                   
14 Lucus and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) also demonstrate that a uniquely determined wage path determines 
associated endogenous variables uniquely.  
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maximization problem. So, the rent revenue of residents   is determined by (2.15). The 
urban boundary ZH is determined such that (2.32) is satisfied. 
I sum up above analysis in Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 1. There is an allocation where all endogenous variables are determined such that 
(2.4)–(2.6), (2.9)–(2.10), (2.12), (2.15), and (2.19)–(2.32) are satisfied. Any such allocation 
is uniquely determined by the unique equilibrium land use ( )f x , 3 ( )
Ht x , 3 ( )
At x , and 
2 ( )
At x . 
 
3.3 Characteristics of equilibrium land use  
This section devotes to figure out how equilibrium land use ( )f x , 3 ( )
Ht x , 3 ( )
At x , and 
2 ( )
At x  changes with x. First, I focus on the land use in urban areas: ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x . 
Applying the implicit function theorem to the system of (3.2) and (3.5), that is given in 
Appendix 3-C, I can obtain ( ) 0df x
dx
  and 3 ( )
Hdt x
dx
 ⋛ 0 at any [ , ]Hx X Z . This states 
that ( )f x  always increases as x approaches the urban boundary. This result is intuitive 
because the commuting cost increases as x approaches the urban boundary. In contrast, 
3 ( )
Ht x  can either increase or decrease. As carnivores move towards the CBD, both human 
population density 1 ( )f x  and the probability of encountering residents ( )x  increase. 
When the amount of the increase in 1 ( )f x  is larger than that in ( )x , 3 ( )Ht x  increases 
because they can get more foods with less risk of encountering humans by moving towards 
the CBD. On the other hand, when the amount of the increase in 1 ( )f x  is smaller than that 
in ( )x , 3 ( )Ht x  decreases because they have less chance to get foods but face more risk as  
they move towards the CBD. Thus, the sign of 3 ( )
Hdt x
dx
 depends on such relation. 
Next, I focus on the land use in natural habitats: 3 ( )
At x  and 2 ( )
At x . The time density of 
herbivores is equal everywhere at the equilibrium: 2 ( )
A
A H
Tt x
Z Z


. Therefore, from (3.7), 
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3 ( )
At x  depends only on the plant density that grows naturally without being planted by 
humans 1( )x . This implies that 3 ( )At x  is larger at which 1( )x  is larger.  
The intuitive reason for this result is given as follows. Since herbivores have risks of 
encounter with carnivores, they can change the length of stay at each location according to 
3 ( )
At x . In contrast, carnivores have no risk in natural habitats. Hence, the carnivore chooses 
3 ( )
At x  at each location as if the carnivore threatens the herbivores so as to maximize its food 
consumption. Therefore, 3 ( )
At x  is determined from the first order condition with respect to 
time densities of herbivores (3.7).  
I show the intuitive reason why 3 ( )
At x  is larger at which 1( )x  is larger. Suppose an 
equilibrium where 3 ( )
At x  is smaller in places with high densities of plants. Then, herbivores 
stay more time there because they can eat more plants. This situation is ineffective for 
carnivores. Hence, there is an incentive to deviate this equilibrium. So, it is not the Nash 
equilibrium. Consequently, carnivores choose higher 3 ( )
At x  at which 1( )x  is larger so 
that herbivores are evenly distributed across natural habitats. If 1( )x  is uniform across the 
natural habitat, then both 3 ( )
At x  and 2 ( )
At x  are uniform across the natural habitat. This is 
because herbivores can eat the same amount of plants no matter where they go, so the 
herbivore’s time density will be constant. Then, carnivores do not have to bother to stay 
longer time in a specific location. 
I conclude this section with one possible illustration of an equilibrium path for ( )hn x , 
3 ( )
Ht x , 3 ( )
At x , and 2 ( )
At x , summarized above descriptions, under the case where 1( )x  
linearly increases with x. The left vertical axis on Figure 3 indicates the human population 
density, and the right vertical axis indicates the time density of animals. The human 
population density decreases as x approaches the urban boundary. Since I assume that the 
housing development cost that is needed to convert the natural habitat to the residential area 
is greater than zero, the human population density at the urban boundary is greater than zero. 
In the residential area with carnivores’ entering, the slope of the human population density is 
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steeper than that in the residential area without carnivores’ entering. The time density of 
carnivores might be non-continuous at the urban boundary. The time density of herbivores is 
constant across the habitat.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. One example of the equilibrium land use for humans and wildlife. 
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Appendix 3-A. The Lagrangian function and first order conditions for the 
laissez-faire equilibrium 
First, I set the Lagrangian function expressing the carnivore’s behavior in the laissez-faire 
market equilibrium. After that, integrating the Lagrangian function by parts yields  
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
( ) ( ( ) ( ) )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
A H A H
A H A A A A A A
H H H H H H H
h
A H
H
A A
H H
H H
H
Z Z
Z X
Z Z
Z Z
Z Z
X X
Z
X
Q Q M T t x dx t x dx
Z Q x Q x dx x t x t x N dx
X Q x Q x dx x t x t x n x dx
X M x M x dx
  
  
   
 
      
  
  
 
 
 
 



 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
H
h
HZ
X
x t x x n x dx  
         (3A.1) 
Differentiating (3A.1) with respective variables, we obtain (3A.2)–(3A.10): 
3 3
3
0 : ( ) 0A HA ZQ
    

,                  (3A.2) 
3 3
3
0 : ( ) 0HH XQ
    

,                  (3A.3) 
3 3
3
0 : ( ) 0X
M
     

,            (3A.4) 
3
3
0 : ( ) 0
( )
A
A xQ x
  

 ,                   (3A.5) 
3
3
0 : ( ) 0
( )
H
H xQ x
   

 ,         (3A.6) 
3
3
0 : ( ) 0
( )
x
M x
   

 ,               (3A.7) 
3 3 3 3 3 3
3
3
0 : ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
H H H H H
h hH
h
x t x n x x t x t x n x
t x
x x n x
    
 
    

 　　　　　　
  (3A.8) 
3 3 2 2
3
0 : ( ) ( ) 0
( )
A A
A x t x Nt x
     

,              (3A.9) 
3 3 3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
H H H H
h ht X X t X X n X X t X X n XX
        

.      (3A.10) 
Next, I set the Lagrangian function expressing the herbivore’s behavior in the 
laissez-faire market equilibrium. Then, integrating the Lagrangian function by parts yields  
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2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
( ( ) )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
A
A H A A A A
H A A
A
H
A A
H H
A A
H H
Z
Z
Z Z
Z Z
Z Z
Z Z
Q M T t x dx
Z Q x Q x dx x t x t x n x dx
Z M x M x dx x t x t x N dx
  
   
  
    
  
  

 
 


         (3A.11) 
Differentiating (3A.11) with respective variables, we obtain (3A.12)–(3A.16): 
2 2
2
0 : ( ) 0A HZ
Q
    

,                    (3A.12) 
2 2
2
0 : ( ) 0HZ
M
     

,                    (3A.13) 
2
2
0 : ( ) 0
( )
A x
Q x
   

 ,                         (3A.14) 
2
2
0 : ( ) 0
( )
x
M x
   

 ,              (3A.15) 
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
2
0 : ( ) ( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) 0
( )
A A A A A
A x n x t x t x t x x t x Nt x
          

.     (3A.16) 
The first order conditions with respect to shadow prices are omitted because they are 
obvious. 
 
Appendix 3-B. The derivation of the first order conditions for the time 
densities of animals and of the time density of herbivores 
I obtain the equilibrium condition with respect to 3 ( )
Ht x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z ,  t3
A(x)  and 
2 ( )
At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z . First, integrating both sides of (3A.6) and (3A.7) from X to x 
and both sides of (3A.5) and (3A.14)–(3A.15) from x to ZH yields the following:  
Lemma 3B-1. 3 3( ) ( )
A A Hx Z  , 3 3( ) ( )H Hx X  , 3 3( ) ( )x X  , 2 2( ) ( )A A Hx Z  , and 
2 2( ) ( )
Hx Z  . 
From Lemma 3B-1, 3 3( )
A x  , 3 3( )H x  , 3 3( )x   , 2 2( )A x  , and 
2 2( )x   . Plugging these equations into (3A.8) and (3A.9) yields the equilibrium 
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condition (3.5) and (3.6). Similarly, plugging these equations into (3A.16) yields the 
equilibrium condition (3.7). 
I obtain the equilibrium 2 ( )
At x . Solving (3.6) for 2 ( )
At x  yields 2 3 3 2( ) ( )
At x N  . 
Substituting this into (2.11) yields 3 3 2( ) ( )
A HT N Z Z   . So, we can obtain the 
equilibrium time density of herbivores: 2 ( ) ( )
A A Ht x T Z Z  .  
 
Appendix 3-C. Proof of Lemma 1, 2, and 3 
Proof of Lemma 1. I investigate the sign of 
3
( )
( )H
df x
dt x
. Totally differentiating (3.2) with 
respect to ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x  yields 
 
   
2
2 2
3
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) 0,
( ( ) ( ) )
H
h h
h
w A x C C Cdf x df x
f x f x f f
C g M M x dt x
f V E g M x
           
  
  N
　　　　　　　　　　　　
 
 
where 0f
C
UC
f U
   

,  
1 0
( ( ) ( ) )h C
C
V E g M x U
  
  N
, and 
2
2 2( )
ff ff
Cf
C C
U UC U
Uf U
   

 
(define hC
UU
C


, hf
UU
f


, 
2
2
h
ff
UU
f


, and 
2
h
Cf
UU
C f

 
).  
From the second order condition with respect to the bid rent maximization problem, 
 
2 2
2 2 2
( ) ( ) 1 0
( )( )
r w A x C C C
f x ff f x f
           
 
. 
 
Hence we can obtain  

 23
2 00
0
( )( ) 1 0
( ( ) ) ( )( )
h
H
h
M xdf x C
I g M x f xdt x r
f 

        


. 
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Next, I explore the monotonicity of the best response function 3( )
H
resR t  at 3 [0,  1]
Ht  . 
We need to prove that to every t1 and t2 in [0,  1]  such that t1 < t2 ⇒ 2 1( ) ( )res resR t R t . From 
the mean value theorem, there exists some c in 1 2( , )t t  such that  
 
2 1
2 1
( ) ( )( ) res resres
R t R tR c
t t
 

. 
 
Since 
3
0H
df
dt
 , 2 1
2 1
( ) ( )( ) 0res resres
R t R tR c
t t
  

. Thus, 2 1( ) ( )res resR t R t . Therefore, 
3( ( ))
H
resR t x  is monotonically increasing in 3 ( )
Ht x  on [0,  1] .|| 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. I investigate the sign of 3 ( )
( )
Hdt x
df x
. Differentiating (3.8) with respect to 
( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x  yields  
3 3 3 3 3 33 3 3 3 3 3 3
32
2 ( ( )) ( ( ))( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
( )( )
H H HH H H
H
t x t t xt x t t x x
df x dt x
f xf x
                 .15 
Then,  
3 3 3 3 3 3 33
3 3 3 3 3 3
00
( ( )) ( ( )) ( )( ) 1 0
( ) ( )2 ( ( )) ( ( ))
H H HH
H H H
t x t t x xdt x
df x f xt x t t x
    
  

      
      
 
Similarly, from the mean value theorem, ( ( ))carR f x  is monotonically decreasing in ( )f x . || 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. At the carnivores’ search boundary within a city X, the time density is 
zero and unique. It is thus sufficient to prove that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of a 
system of (3.2) and (3.8) with respect to ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x  is different from 0 at all 
[ , ]Hx X Z . Then the system of (3.2) and (3.8) defines ( )f x  and 3 ( )Ht x  at all 
[ , ]Hx X Z  as Ck functions of x in some neighborhood of ( )f x  and 3 ( )Ht x  at all 
[ , ]Hx X Z  (from Sydsæter et al., 2005, Chapter 6, 6.3). 
                                                   
15 3 3 3 3 32
3
HM Q mN
P
 

  . However, even if you increase f (x) at a certain location x, the change in N2 is 
zero because there is no width dx． 
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The system of (3.2) and (3.8) is rewritten by  
 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
[ ( ) ( ( ) ( ) , ( ))] ( ) 0
( ( )) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
f
h
C
H H H A H
U
w A x C V E g M x f x f x
U
t x t t x x t Z N f x

     
       
     
N
 
Totally differentiating this system with respect to endogenous variables ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x , 
and any location x yields 
  
3
3
3
3 00
001 0
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( ( ) ) ( )
C
h
C
f ffHh
h H
h C C
N
U
g M N
U
U UM xC Cg M dt x f df x x dx
I g M x f U Ut x


 
 


 
              



 


0 at 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3
0
0
2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
x X
H H H H A Ht x t x t x dt x t Z N df x x dx     
 


 
      
  
 
In the matrix form, 

3
0 0
3 3
3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) 2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))
ff h
C C
H
A H H H H
A
U g M N
f
df x xU U
dx
dt x x
t Z N t x t x t x

 
  
 

 
                   


 
Under the assumption where 3 3( ) 0 and ( ) 0       on 3 ( ) [0,  1]Ht x  , the determinant of 
the Jacobian matrix of the system is always positive: 

3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
00 0
( )2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0ff H H H A Hh
C C
U g M NA f t t t t Z N
U U
   
 
        
 
Hence, the equilibrium ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x  are continuous on [ , ]HX Z . In addition, to 
investigate how ( )f x  and 3 ( )
Ht x  change with x, I derive 
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 

3
3 3 3 3 3 3
0 00
0
3
3 3 2 2
0 0
0
( ) 1 ( )( )[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) 0,
( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
H H H h
C
H
ff A H
C
df x g M Nx t x t x t x x
dx A U
Udt x f x x t Z N
dx A U
    
   
 

 

 
         
 
  
 
     
 


 
 
Since ( ) 0df x
dx
  at any [ , ]Hx X Z , the urban boundary is uniquely determined. This 
implies that there is no sub-center and natural habitats within residential districts in a city. ||  
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4. First-best optimum   
4.1 Social welfare function and Lagrangian function  
The social welfare function W is composed of the total utility of households:16  
hW N V .                  (4.1) 
A social planner solves  
3 3
3 3 2 1
( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), , , , ,
( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ,
,
,
max
H
h
A H A H
h
C x f x r x n x V Q M P
t x t x t x n x Z X
N V
   
    N
　   s.t. (2.7), (2.11), (2.12), (2.14), (2.15), and (2.20)–(2.31). 
I obtain the social optimal solution using the following Lagrangian function:17 
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T t x dx x Q x t x t x n x dx
 
  
 
   
 
 

 　　　　　　　  
                                                   
16 I also analyze the case where people are concerned about animals’ welfare in terms of the awareness of 
animal protection. There are some animal protection organizations worldwidely such as the International Fund 
for Animal Welfare (IFAW). In this case we should consider the animals’ utility. The following utility function 
of individual animal in species i is assumed: ui = Ui(Qi, Mi,). The social welfare function is composed of total 
utility of households, carnivores, and herbivores: 3 3 2 2hW N V N u N u    . Alternatively, this can be 
regarded as an altruistic utility function of humans by regarding 0   and 0   as weights. 
17 In the literature of urban economics, the optimal control theory has been generally applied to a distance 
dimension instead of a time dimension to obtain optimal solutions at each location (e.g. Pines and Sadka 1985; 
Arnot, Pines and Sadka 1986; Wheaton 1998). This Lagrangian includes distance from the city center x, and it 
has three heterogenous regions: the residential area without carnivores’ entering, the residential area with 
carnivores’ entering, and natural habitats. The boundary conditions between heterogenous regions are 
endogenously determined. A similar type of Lagrangian is employed in Kono and Kawaguchi (2016) to explore 
transport policies in a city with heterogenous regions and in Kono and Joshi (in press) to explore land use 
regulation in multiple heterogenous zones. 
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where 1 3 2 3 2( ),  ( ),  ,  , ( ),  ( ),  ,  ( ),  ,  , , ( ),  and ( )
O O H A
h ix x x x S s x x x           are shadow 
prices. Note that  1,2,3i . The boundary condition is given by 3 ( ) 0Ht X  . I divide the 
original Lagrangian function by the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to (2.15),  , to 
represent it in monetary terms. To obtain first order conditions, I integrate the Lagrangian by 
parts. The modified Lagrangian function and the first order conditions are found in Appendix 
4-A.  
 
4.2 Marginal social values of species  
I first explore the marginal social value or the shadow price of carnivores S3, herbivores S2, 
and plants at location x s1(x) to clarify how much more knowledge is needed to measure the 
value of each species in the location-dependent setting than in the location-independent 
setting as in Eichner and Pethig (2009). In addition, I explore the sign of the social values 
because it is important to determine how equilibrium land use deviates from the social 
optimum.  
 
Proposition 1.  The marginal social value of carnivores, herbivores, and plants at location 
x, or Lagrange multipliers S3, S2, and S1(x) are given by, respectively,  
 
3
3 30 0
[1] Benefits  of ecosystem services [2] Humans' aggregate disutility of carnivores
( ) ( ) ( ) .Hhh h
h h
H HZ ZE N g MS n x dx n x t x dx
U C U C
    
     
　 　
  (4.3) 
 
2 1
2 1 2
2 2
0
[4] Benefits or costs of decreasing plants[3] Benefits  of ecosystem services
( ) ( ) ( ) .
[ ( ) ]
A
h A
h
H A
H
Z Z
Z
E N nS n x dx s x t x dx
U C t x N
   
   
　　 　
  (4.4) 
 
1 2
1 3 2 2 2
2
0
[6] Benefits or costs of increasing carnivores[5] Benefits  of ecosystem services
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )),A Ah
h
HZ E Ns x n x dx S t x t x
U C P
 

  
  
　
[ , ]H Ax Z Z   (4.5) 
Proof of Proposition 1.  See Appendix 4-B. || 
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Considering the location dependent externalities caused by the encroachment of carnivores 
into the urban areas, some novel components are observed in the value of species: i) the 
humans’ aggregate marginal disutility with respect to the risk of being killed by carnivores, 
which is represented by term [2]; ii) the social benefits or damages of changes in the 
steady-state population of the other species, which are represented by terms [4] and [5].18 
Terms [1], [3], and [5] represent the humans’ aggregate marginal benefits of enhancing the 
provision of ecosystem services by a marginal increase in each species.  
These equations imply that the sign of one species depends on the sign of other species 
through the food-chain. In particular, the values of all species depend on the humans’ 
aggregate disutility of the encroachment by carnivores. 
It is noted that the marginal social value of plants s1(x) depends on location x. An 
intuitive reason for this result can be expressed by term [6]. In general, the time density of 
herbivores 2 ( )
At x  is likely to depend on the location because of the habitat’s geographical 
features such as rivers and cliffs. For example, if a topography is steep, the herbivore’s time 
density 2 ( )
At x  is quite small because it is difficult to get the plants there. Thus, the 
magnitude of term [6] is close to zero. Term [6] can be either positive or negative depending 
on the sign of S3. Therefore, the marginal social value of plants is high in the place where 
herbivores can enjoy eating plants if S3 > 0, whereas it is low in that place if S3 < 0. That is, 
when carnivores stay a lot of time in the urban area, the social value of plants at x is low. In 
contrast, term [5] is independent of location, the value curve of s1(x) vertically shifts up or 
down according to the provision of ecosystem services stemming from plants. 
 
                                                   
18 In the current paper, the value of species i’s biomass consumed by humans and the opportunity cost of urban 
land use, which are observed in Eichner and Pethig (2009), do not appear in (4.3)–(4.5). The former is regarded 
as a part of ecosystem services. Thus, this component corresponds with term [1], [3] or [5]. The latter is not 
observed because the current paper does not consider habitat resources such as the territory of animals.  
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4.3 First-best optimum vs the laissez-faire equilibrium   
This section is devoted to understanding how the laissez-faire equilibrium deviates from 
first-best optimum in terms of animals’ time densities 3 3,  ( ) ( )
H At x t x , and 2 ( )
At x , and human 
population density ( )hn x  due to the absence of markets in the ecosystem.  
 
4.3.1 Time densities of animals at each location 
First, I focus on 3 ( )
Ht x . From Appendix 4-C, the optimal condition with respect to 3 ( )
Ht x  at 
any [ , ]Hx X Z  is given by 
2 3 3
3 3 2
3 3
  
[8] Benefit or cost of [7] Humans' disutility of      an increase in carnivores     carnivores
( )   ( ) .
( )
A Hh
hH
h
S b g M Nn x N S t Z
P t x U C P
          
              (4.6) 
where 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
3
( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
H H H A H
h hH
b n x t x t x t x x n x t Z N
t x
         

,  
and this is zero at the equilibrium as shown in (3.5). The optimal 3 ( )
Ht x  is determined so as 
to satisfy (4.6). The LHS of (4.6) indicates the benefit or cost of changes in herbivores when 
the time density of carnivores marginally increases at [ ,  ]Hx X Z  within the city. The first 
term on the RHS of (4.6) represents the humans’ aggregate marginal disutility of 
encountering carnivores. Since the carnivores stay longer in the urban area, the herbivore’s 
risk of encountering carnivores decreases. From (2.20), in this situation, the number of 
carnivores increases, which is represented by the second term on the RHS of (4.6). Since S3 
and S2 can be either positive or negative as shown in Proposition 1, I can obtain the 
following proposition by comparing (3.5) with (4.6). 
 
Proposition 2 (The first-best optimal time density of carnivores in a city). The optimal 
3 ( )
Ht x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z  can be either larger or smaller than the equilibrium 3 ( )
Ht x . 
Suppose the case where the humans’ disutility arising from the risk of encountering 
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carnivores is larger than the ecosystem services arising from carnivores; that is, S3 is 
negative. If S2 is positive (negative), then the optimal 3 ( )
Ht x  is larger (smaller) than the 
equilibrium 3 ( )
Ht x . 
 
Proposition 2 says two points. One is that even if the humans’ disutility arising from the 
risk of encountering carnivores is larger, there are cases in which, at optimum, the carnivore 
should stay longer in the city. The other is that when carnivores encroach into a city and its 
effect on humans is terrible, we have to not only drive carnivores out of the city, but we also 
have to consider the effects of changes in the number of herbivores on the social welfare, 
simultaneously.  
The first point may appear counter-intuitive. The intuitive reason is given as follows. 
Since S3 is negative, an increase in the number of carnivores indicates a social cost; so, the 
RHS is positive. To satisfy (4.6), the LHS should be positive, that is, a marginal social 
benefit. Since S2 is positive, an increase in the number of herbivores is socially beneficial. If 
carnivores stay longer time than the equilibrium in the city, they can eat more garbage, but 
face a higher risk of mortality. The increased risk is larger than the benefit of eating garbage. 
In the steady state, as shown in (2.21), this situation leads to an increase in the population of 
herbivores, which is socially beneficial. 
 
Proposition 3 (The first-best optimal time density of herbivores). The optimal time 
density of herbivores is given by  
2 ( )
A
A H
Tt x
Z Z


.                          (4.7) 
Proof of Proposition 3.  See Appendix 4-B. || 
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This assertion says that both the optimal and equilibrium time densities of herbivores depend 
only on the city boundary ZH. So, the amount differs because ZH at optimal differs from ZH at 
equilibrium. If optimal ZH is larger (smaller) than equilibrium ZH, then the time density of 
herbivores is larger (smaller) than the equilibrium. I will show how the equilibrium city size 
deviates from the social optimum in a later subsection.  
This also indicates that the herbivore spends the same time at any location in the natural 
habitat even in the optimum. To give the intuitive reason for this, we have to consider how 
the time density of carnivores in the natural habitat 3 ( )
At x  deviates from the social optimum. 
I will show this next.  
From Appendix 4-C, I can obtain the optimal condition with respect to 2 ( )
At x  at any 
[ , ]H Ax Z Z : 
33 2
2 2 3
2 2
[9] Benefit or cost of 
      changes in herbivores 
( )
[ ( ) ].
( )
A
A
A A H
A
H
Z
Z
t x dxS b S N t x
t x Z Z
      


               (4.8) 
where    2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
2
( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( )
( )
A A A A
A
b n x t x t x t x t x N
t x
        

,  
and this is zero at the equilibrium as shown in (3.7). The optimal 3 ( )
At x  is determined so 
that (4.8) is satisfied. The LHS of (4.8) indicates the benefit or cost of changes in the number 
of carnivores when the time density of herbivores marginally increases at [ , ]H Ax Z Z . The 
RHS indicates the benefit or cost of changes in the number of herbivores. 
3 ( ) ( )
A A H
A
H
Z
Z
t x dx Z Z  is the average optimal time density of carnivores in the natural 
habitat. This equation says that when the optimal 3 ( )
At x  is larger than its average, then the 
RHS is not equal to zero, implying that the equilibrium 3 ( )
At x  does not correspond with the 
optimal 3 ( )
At x . 
From Proposition 3, the optimal time density of herbivores is independent of location: 
2 ( )
A
A H
Tt x
Z Z


. So, the optimal path of 3 ( )
At x  on [ , ]H AZ Z  is only associated with an 
exogenous variable: the number of plants that grows naturally 1( )x . It is included in 
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1( )n x  as shown in (2.22). When 1( )x  is equal across the natural habitat, the optimal 
3 ( )
At x  is also equal across the natural habitat. Then, RHS is equal to zero. Thus, the optimal 
condition (4.8) corresponds with the equilibrium condition (3.7), implying that the 
equilibrium 3 ( )
At x  corresponds with its optimum. I can summarize the above description 
about 3 ( )
At x  as follows. 
 
Proposition 4 (The first-best optimal time density of carnivores in natural habitats).  
(i) When 1( )x  is equal across the natural habitat, the optimum 3 ( )At x  corresponds with 
the equilibrium 3 ( )
At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z .  
(ii) When 1( )x  varies across the natural habitat, the optimal 3 ( )At x  at any [ , ]H Ax Z Z  
can be either larger or smaller than the equilibrium 3 ( )
At x  except for the location where the 
optimum 3 ( )
At x  is equal to its average.  
 
The result (i) says that when the plant density that grows naturally is equal across the 
natural habitat, there is no spatial bias in time densities of both carnivores and herbivores. 
This implies that there is no distortion in predator–prey interactions at any location.  
Next, I focus on the result (ii). To clearly understand how the equilibrium 3 ( )
At x  
deviates from optimum when 1( )x  varies across the natural habitat, suppose that 1( )x  
linearly increases with x, and that S3 is negative and S2 is positive. Then, if 1( )x  is larger 
(smaller) than its average, then the sign of RHS of (4.8) is positive. Thus, the optimal 3 ( )
At x  
is larger (smaller) than the equilibrium 3 ( )
At x . The intuitive reason for this result is given as 
follows. There are two externalities generated by the marginal increase in herbivores’ 
offspring: (A) the number of herbivores directly increase because their predator increases 
(that is a social marginal external benefit because S2 is positive); (B) the number of 
carnivores indirectly increases because their prey increases (that is a social marginal external 
cost because S3 is negative). In the place with higher 1( )x , the herbivores eat a lot of plants 
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and face less risk of encountering predators than its optimal level. So, the number of 
herbivores’ offspring is more than the optimal level. This implies that the social marginal 
external cost (B) are larger than the social marginal external benefit (A). To balance between 
marginal benefits and costs, one needs to increase 3 ( )
At x  to make herbivores face more risk 
of encountering predators. To achieve the optimum, 3 ( )
At x  is increased so that the social 
marginal benefit of declining carnivores is equal to the social marginal cost of declining 
herbivores. In the place with lower 1( )x , vice versa.  
The optimum condition (4.8) tells us that if the plant density that grows naturally is just 
spatially heterogeneous, spatially dependent distortions will appear in the predator–prey 
interaction. In this model, animals optimize their net offspring taking the other animals 
behavior as given. This results also says that even if both carnivores and herbivores take best 
response to the other animal’s behavior, the predator–prey interaction is inefficient as long as 
the plant density is spatially heterogeneous.    
 
4.3.2 Human population density at each location  
Next, I investigate market failures with respect to ( )hn x  at each location. According to 
(2.30), ( )hn x  is the reciprocal of housing lot size ( )f x . From Appendix 4-C, the social 
optimum condition with respect to ( )f x  at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z  is 
 
3
2 3 3 3 3
3 [10] Benefit or cost of [11] Benefit or cost of 
       decreasing herbivores        increasing herbivores
( ) ( )( ) [ ( )   ( ( )) .
( ) ( )
H
Hh h hU U n x t xr x S x t x
f x C x P
   

   
   
    (4.9)  
At the equilibrium, the RHS of (4.9) should be zero. Hence, I can obtain the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 5 (The first-best optimal human population density). When S2 > 0, then if 
3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ( ))
Hx t x     , then the optimal ( )hn x  is larger (smaller) than the market 
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equilibrium at any [ ,  ]Hx X Z . When S2 < 0, then if 3 3 3 3( ) ( ) ( ( ))
Hx t x     , then the 
optimal ( )hn x  is smaller (larger) than the market equilibrium at any [ ,  ]
Hx X Z . 
 
The interpretation of the optimal condition is given as follows. When the housing lot size 
increases, the human population density decreases. Then the carnivores face less risk of 
being killed by humans. From (2.21), this makes the number of herbivores decrease. The 
first term on the RHS of (4.9) represents the externality of a decrease in the population of 
herbivores. On the other hand, the carnivores will feed on less food at [ ,  ]Hx X Z . So, 
from (2.21), the population of herbivores will increase. The second term on the RHS of (4.9) 
represents the externality of an increase in the population of herbivores. 
In Proposition 5, 3  is the humans’ response to harmful carnivores, that is, if the 
response is large, they try to exterminate them even if the harmful carnivores stay in the 
urban areas for a short time. 3 3( ( ))
Ht x  indicates the carnivores’ availability of food. The 
intuition behind this assertion is that when humans are eager to exterminate the harmful 
carnivores and/or the carnivores’ availability of food is quite low, if we want to increase the 
number of herbivores (i.e. the shadow price of herbivores S2 is positive), then the optimal 
human density is larger than the market equilibrium to decline the number of carnivores. 
 
4.3.3 City size  
Finally, I investigate how the laissez-faire equilibrium city size deviates from the first best 
social optimum city size. The optimal condition with respect to the city size can be obtained 
from that with respect to the city boundary ZH. The equilibrium city boundary is determined 
so that the land rent equals the cost of housing development (i.e. r(ZH) = rH).19  
However, the market equilibrium condition does not hold because of externalities of a 
decrease in the number of animals and plants. In addition, as shown in Proposition 1, S2 and 
                                                   
19 This model does not consider the agricultural area, so that the land rent at the city boundary equals the cost 
of housing development in the market equilibrium. 
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S3 can be either positive or negative depending on the situation. In this sense, I can obtain 
Proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 6 (The first-best optimal city size). The first-best optimal city size can be 
larger or smaller than the market equilibrium city size. 
Proof of Proposition 6. See Appendix 4-B.|| 
 
4.4 Numerical examples  
In this section, I numerically simulate the theoretical properties to understand whether the 
optimal city size is larger or smaller than the equilibrium city size according to 
human–ecosystem interactions, which depend on the degree of human’s disutility to the 
encroachment of carnivores and the value of biodiversity. I will describe how to set 
parameters to compute the example. 
Suppose the total length of an area consisting of a city plus a natural habitat is 60 km 
with a width of 1 km. I divide the city into four discrete areas and the natural habitat into five 
discrete areas. Carnivores encroach into the forth area in the city, counting from the area next 
to the CBD. The total number of humans is normalized as 20hN   (thousands of 
humans). 20  I specify the utility function as 
3
1
( ) ( ) ln ( ) ( )h i i
i
v x C x b f x cM x N

    , 
where b, c, and i   1,  2,  3i  are positive parameters. The parameters used in this 
simulation are collected from previous studies or real world situations as much as possible.  
As in Kono and Kawaguchi (2015), the income per household per year is set at 
US$40,000. The housing parameter in the utility function b is set at 8,000, which results in 
20 percent of the income of US$40,000. I set the number of trips to the CBD as 225 round 
                                                   
20 Any unit of total number of households will do, as long as it is positive. For example, Eichner and Pethig 
(2006) used 100 as the total number of households. 
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trips per year per person, average speed as 30 km/hour, travel cost including travel time as 
US$30/hour. Further, I set the cost of housing land development rH as US$20,000.  
Next, I set some ecosystem parameters such as parameters of the Lotka-Volterra 
equations ( i , i ,  mi ,  2,  3i ) and ( )x . In addition, I specify some functions in the 
ecosystem models such as availability of food and plant density: 3 3( ( ))
Ht x , 2 2( ( ))At x , and 
1( )n x . Although these parameters and functions vary according to species, the number of 
carnivores is smaller than the number of the herbivores as long as these animals are in the 
same food chain. So, I set the ecosystem parameters so as to satisfy the food chain: 
3 0.889  , 3 0.000117  , 2 0.604  , 2 1.43  , 3 0.244m  , 2 0.193m  , ( ) 1000x  , 
2
2 2 2( ( )) 2( ( )) 0.5
A At x t x    , and 3 3 3( ( )) exp(0.5 ( )) 1.32H Ht x t x    . Finally, I specify the 
plant density as 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ln( ( )) ( )
A Hn x x a x t Z N   .21 I set 1( )x  = x so as to satisfy the 
food chain. Finally, I set some parameters representing the human–ecosystem interactions, 
that is, i   1,  2,  3i  and c. i  indicates the effect of biodiversity on humans’ utility, 
and c represents the humans’ fear of encroachment by carnivores. Thus, ic   represents the 
trade-off between them. I set 1 2 3       as in Eichner and Pethig (2006).  
  and c vary according to the situation surrounding the humans and the ecosystem. I 
explore whether the optimal city size is larger or smaller than the equilibrium city size 
according to c  . In order to conduct sensitivity analyses, I analyze the following cases: (i) 
when c = 2000,   = 400, 500, and 600; (ii) when c = 5000,   = 400, 500, and 600; (iii) 
when c = 8000,   = 400, 500, and 600. The results of these simulations are presented in 
Figure 4 and Table 2. 
Figure 4 shows that regardless of parameter c, as parameter   decreases, the relation 
between the equilibrium city size EHZ  and the optimal city size 
O
HZ  changes from 
E O
H HZ Z  to 
E O
H HZ Z . In other words, the optimal city size tends to be larger than the 
equilibrium city size as the effect of biodiversity on humans’ utility   decreases. Next, I 
                                                   
21 ln( ( ))a x  implies diminishing marginal increases in the plant density with respect to nutrients. 
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focus on the changes in the parameter c, taking the biodiversity parameter   as constant. 
Figure 3 shows that the larger c is, the smaller E OH HZ Z  is. This implies that the optimal 
city size tends to be larger than the equilibrium city size as the human’s fear of encroachment 
by carnivores increases. Table 2 shows that regardless of parameter c, the optimal numbers 
of three species are greater than those at the equilibrium, and the optimal number increases 
as biodiversity parameter   increases. In addition, regardless of parameter c, the 
carnivore’s time density in the residential district is smaller than that at the equilibrium, and 
the optimal time density decreases as biodiversity parameter   decreases. 
The intuitive interpretation is as follows. Since the value of ecosystem services is high, 
the city government should expand the habitat to enrich the quality of ecosystem services. 
On the other hand, when the value of the ecosystem services is small, the humans’ fear of 
encountering carnivores is more influential on the social welfare. Therefore, the government 
should expand the city to lower the time density of carnivores in the residential district. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The urban boundary at the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum. 
Note: EHZ  and 
O
HZ  denote the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimal urban boundary, 
respectively. E OH HZ Z  indicates the difference between them. The left, middle, and right lines indicate 
how E OH HZ Z  changes as   decreases, taking c = 2000, c = 5000, and c = 8000 as given, respectively. 
c

  
 
2000c   
5000c   8000c   
E O
H HZ Z (km) 
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Table 2. Numerical results (First-best optimum) 
 (i) c = 2000 
 Laissez-faire equilibrium  Optimum 
 UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x   UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x  
400   14 36.5 10.6 2.3 0.091  16 39.3 11.6 2.8 0.034 
500   14 36.5 10.6 2.3 0.091  14 42.1 12.0 3.1 0.039 
600   14 36.5 10.6 2.3 0.091  10 46.7 13.2 3.4 0.051 
  
 (ii) c = 5000 
 Laissez-faire equilibrium  Optimum 
 UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x   UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x  
400   12 37.7 11.1 2.1 0.10  16 39.2 11.8 3.0 0.045  
500   12 37.7 11.1 2.1 0.10  14 42.0 12.3 3.2 0.045 
600   12 37.7 11.1 2.1 0.10  10 46.6 13.4 3.4 0.055 
  
 (iii) c = 8000 
 Laissez-faire equilibrium  Optimum 
 UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x   UGB (km) N1 N2 N3 3 ( )
Ht x  
400   12 37.7 11.3 2.0 0.095  18 37.2 11.7 2.9 0.044 
500   12 37.7 11.3 2.0 0.095  14 41.9 12.5 3.3 0.051 
600   12 37.7 11.3 2.0 0.095  10 46.5 13.6 3.4 0.057 
 
Note: UGB is the location of the urban growth boundary. N1, N2, and N3 are the numbers of plants, 
herbivores, and carnivores, respectively. 3 ( )
Ht x  is the carnivore’s time density in the residential district at 
[ ,  ]Hx X Z .  
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Appendix 4-A. The Lagrangian function and first-best optimal conditions 
Integrating the Lagrangian function (4.2) by parts, I can obtain 
 
   
1 3 3
1 1 1
0 0
0 0
0
( ) 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( [ ( ) ] ) ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )
h
h
h
H
h h h h
h h
H H
H HA
H
H
Z Z
ZZ Z
Z
Z
N VL
x w A C x f x r x x dx x n x dx
f x f x
r x r dx N N A p x dx x M x t x N dx
x U C x f x g M x E V dx S n x dx N

  
  


          
 
         
       
 
  
 N
3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2
2 2 3 3
3 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 3
2 2 3 2
)
( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( ( ) ( ) )
( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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O A H A A
A
H
A A H
H H
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H H H
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Z Z Z
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           
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    
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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H H H H H H H
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H
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A H A A A A
H H
H H
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H H
Z Z
X X
Z Z
X X
Z Z
Z Z
x
X Q x Q x dx x t x t x n x dx
X M x M x dx x t x x n x dx
Z Q x Q x dx x t x t x n x dx
   
   
   
  
  
  
 
 
 


 　
 
 (4A.1) 
Differentiating (4A.1) with respective variables, I obtain (4A.2)–(4A.23). The first order 
conditions with respect to 3 3 3 2( ),  ( ),  ( ),  ,  ( )
A HQ x Q x M x X Q x , and 2 ( )M x  are analogous to 
Appendix 3-A, i.e. (3A.5)–(3A.7), (3A.10), (3A.14), and (3A.15) hold. The different first 
order conditions are as follows: 
 2
( ) 10 : ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
h
h
L r x Ux x x
f f x ff x
       
 
,  (4A.2) 
( )0 : ( ) 0
( ) ( )
h hL x Ux
C x f x C
     
 
,  (4A.3) 
0 : ( ) 1 0
( ) h
L x
r x
    

,  (4A.4) 
48 
 
0
( )0 : 0
( )
h
h
HZL x dx N
f x
   
  ,  (4A.5) 
3 3 3 3 3 30 : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) 0( )
H H H H
h
L x x t x t x x t x
n x
         

,  (4A.6) 
0
0 : ( ) 0h
HZL N x dx
V


   
  ,  (4A.7) 
0
( )0 : 0
( )
h
h
HZL x dx N
A f x
     
  ,  (4A.8) 
10 : ( ) 0( )
L p s x
a x
    

,  (4A.9) 
0 : ( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )h h
L gx x
M x M x
    
 
,  (4A.10) 
3 3
3 3
0 0
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,H
H HZ ZL Ex dx x t x dx S
N N
     
    (4A.11) 
1 1 2 2
2 2
0
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H A
H
Z Z
Z
L Ex dx s x t x dx S
N N
     
     (4A.12) 
1
1 1
0
0 : ( ) 0
HZL Ex dx S
N N
   
  ,   (4A.13) 
1 1 2 2 2 2
1
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0
( )
A A AL S s x x t x t x
n x
     

,  (4A.14) 
1 1 3 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 1
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0,
H H H H A H A H O A H
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H H H H H H H H H H H H
h h
A H A H H H H
L r Z r S n Z pa Z Z t Z t Z t Z
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Z t Z t Z n Z
  
   
 
      

 
 
   (4A.15) 
2 3
2 30 : ( ) 0
HL N NS S Z
P P P
     

,  (4A.16) 
0 : ( ) 0
( )
L x
P x
  

 ,  (4A.17) 
2 3
3
10 : ( ) 0HH
L S X
Q P
    

,   (4A.18) 
3
2 3
3 3
0 : ( ) 0L S X
M P
 

   

,  (4A.19) 
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3 3 3 3 3
3
3 3 3 3 3
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
O H H H
hH
H H H
h h
L x N x t Z n x
t x
x t x t x n x x x n x
   
   
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  　　　　　　
  (4A.20) 
3 2
3
0 : ( ) ( ) 0 
( )
O A
A
L x t x
t x
     

,     (4A.21) 
2
3 2
2 2
0 : ( ) 0A HL S Z
Q P
 

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
,  (4A.22) 
1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 1
2
2 2 2 2 1
0 : ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.
O A A A
A
A A A
L s x N x t x x t x n x
t x
x t x t x n x
    
 
    

 
     (4A.23) 
The first order conditions with respect to Lagrangian multipliers are omitted because they 
are obvious. 
 
Appendix 4-B. Proof of Propositions 1, 3, and 6 
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 3B-1, 3 3( ) ( )
A A Hx Z  , 3 3( ) ( )H Hx X  , 
3 3( ) ( )x X  , 2 2( ) ( )A A Hx Z  , and 2 2( ) ( )Hx Z  . Integrating both sides of (4A.17) 
from x to ZH yields ( ) ( )Hx Z  . 
Combining (4A.3), (4A.4), and (2.30) yields 
( )
( ) h
h
n x
x
U C
 
 
, and plugging this into 
(4A.10) yields ( ) ( ) hh
h
g M
x n x
U C
  
 
. Substituting these equations into (4A.11), and 
solving for S3 yields (4.3). Likewise, solving (4A.12) for S2 yields (4.4). Solving (4A.13) for  
 
1S  and (4A.22) for 2 ( )
A x  yields 3 22
2
( )A Sx
P


  and 1
1
0
( )
HZ ES x dx
N
 
 , respectively. 
Substituting these equations into (4A.14) and solving for 1( )s x  yields (4.5). || 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. I obtain the optimal 2 ( )
At x . Substituting ( ) ( )Hx Z   from 
Lemma A1 into (4A.21) yields 2 3( ) ( )
A O Ht x Z  . Substituting this into (2.11) yields  
3 ( ) ( )
O A H HT Z Z Z   , and then solving it for 3O  yields 3 ( ) ( )O H A HT Z Z Z   . 
Therefore, I can obtain the optimal time density of herbivores: 2 ( ) ( )
A A Ht x T Z Z  . || 
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Proof of Proposition 6. From the proof of Proposition 1, 11 0 ( )h
h
HZ E N
S n x dx
U C
 
  . 
The procedure is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. Substituting several equations in 
Appendix 4-A into (4A.15) yields  
 
1
1
 
2
3 2 2 2 1 2 3 3
2
0
[13] Saving the cost of 
       planting additional plants [14] Cost due to a decrease in plants
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
2 2
3
2 3 3
3
[16] Benefit or cost of a decrease in 
        the time density of herbivores[15] Benefit or cost of a decrease in the population of carnivores
( )  
( )
O A H
H H
t Z
t ZS
P

 

  



3 3 3 2 2
[17] Benefit or cost of a decrease in the population of herbivores
( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .H H H H H A Hh ht Z n Z Z n Z t Z N     

 
The market city boundary is determined at which r(ZH) = rH. Since S2 and S3 can be either 
positive or negative, the RHS of this equation can be either positive or negative. Hence, if 
the RHS of this equation is positive, then the social optimal city size is smaller than the 
equilibrium city size. If it is negative, then the social optimal city size is larger than the 
equilibrium city size.|| 
 
Appendix 4-C. The derivation of the first-best optimal conditions for the 
time densities of animals 
First I obtain the optimal condition (4.6). Combining (4A.18), (4A.19), and (4A.22) with 
Lemma 3B-1 yields, 23 ( )
H Sx
P
   , 2 33
3
( ) Sx
P


 , and 3 32
2
( )A Sx
P


 .  From the proof of 
Proposition 1, ( ) ( ) hh
h
g M
x n x
U C
  
 
. Substituting these equations into (4A.20) and (4A.21) 
yields  
 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3
( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) ( ) ( )H H H O hh h h
h
S g Mn x t x t x t x x n x n x N
P U C
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and 
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2 3
3 2 2 3 3 2
3
[ ( ) ] ( )A H O A HS Nt Z N S t Z
P P
 

   , 
respectively. Combining these equations yields (4.6).  
Next, I obtain the optimal condition (4.8). First I figure out 2 . Solving (3.7) for 2 . 
Then, substituting it into the time constraint of carnivores (2.7) yields 
 
2 2 1 2 3 3
1 [ ] ( ( ) )HA H
HZ
X
N N T t x dx
Z Z
          ,  (4C.1) 
 
where 2 2 2 2 2[ ] ( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) 0
A A At x t x t x     . 
Combining (4A.16) with ( ) ( )Hx Z   yields 2 32 3( )
N Nx S S
P P
    . Then, 
substituting this equation and 3 32
2
( )A Sx
P


  into (4A.23) and solving it for 3 ( )
At x  yields 
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2 1 2 1 1 2
2
3
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O
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   (4C.2) 
Substituting (4C.2) into (2.7)  
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2 1 2 1 1 2
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Solving for 2
O  after using (4C.1) yields 
 
3 2
2 2 1 2 1 2 3
2
1 ( ) ( ( ) )
( )
O H
A H
A H
H
Z Z
Z X
S NN s x dx S T t x dx
P Z Z P
  

         ,  (4C.3) 
 
where 3 3( ) ( )
H A
H A
H
Z Z
X Z
T t x dx t x dx    from the time constraint of carnivore (2.7). Finally, 
substituting (4C.3) into (4A.23)  
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2
3 2
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2
2
1 1 2 2 3
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Since (4.5) and Proposition 3, 1( )s x  is independent of x. With this in mind, arranging this 
equation yields (4.8).|| 
 
Finally, I obtain the optimal condition (4.9). From (4A.4), ( ) 1h x  . Substituting 
( )
( ) h
h
n x
x
U C
 
 
 into (4A.2) after using 1 ( ) ( )hf x n x  from (2.30) yields  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
h h
h
U U r x x n x
f x C x
  
 
.   (4C.4) 
Arranging (4A.6) with 23 ( )
H Sx
P
    and 33 2
3
( )x S
P


  yields  
32
3 3 3 2 3
3
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) 0H H H
S
x t x t x S t x x
P P
  

    .     (4C.5) 
Substituting (4C.5) into (4C.4) yields (4.9). || 
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5. Land use policies   
According to section 4, the human population density and the time density of animals at the 
equilibrium deviates from the first-best optimum. It may be impossible to efficiently regulate 
the animals’ time density at each location because animals do not follow the human law. 
However, we can change the animals’ behavior at least to some extent by using some 
policies. We have two feasible policies: urban boundary regulation that restricts the city size 
and plant density control at each location by planting plants or putting nutrients into soil.22 I 
formally define land use policies as follows: 
 
Definition 2. The city government regulates (1) urban boundary ZH, and (2) plant densities 
n1(x), [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z  . 
 
5.1 Comparative static of the population equilibrium of animals 
Before the analysis of the second-best optimum policies, I investigate the impacts of these 
two policies on the population of animals, and compare the results with Eichner and Pethig 
(2006).23  
The steady state population equilibrium is derived from the following dynamic system:  
 
3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( , ) ( ) 0,
H H H H
H H
N P Z N N Q Z N M Z N m N
N Q Z N N P Z N N m N
  
 
    
   

          (5.1) 
where  
2 3 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
H A A A H A
A A
H H
Z Z
Z Z
P Z t x t x dx t Z t x dx    (5.2) 
 
                                                   
22 In addition to such regulations, I might be able to impose density regulation such as lot size zoning. However, 
it is not so realistic to take the lot size zoning as a countermeasure to the encroachment of dangerous animals. 
So, I do not analyze the lot size zoning in the current paper. 
23 In this research, I can capture the population change in static model without following the route of 
population change. Even in such a case, different results were obtained from Eichner and Pethig (2006). They 
capture the dynamic pathway of wildlife population change by changing the size of natural habitats as an 
external shock. This setting is not suitable to the current situation where carnivore can go out of natural 
habitats. 
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and  
2
1
2 2 2 2 2 1
2 2 2 1 1 2 2
( )
2
2 1 1
( )
2 1
( , ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ( )) [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
( )[ [ ( ) ( )] ]
( )[ (
H
H
H A A
A H A H A H
Q Z
H
A H
a Z
H
A
H
A
H
A A
H H
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z Z
Z Z
Q Z N t x t x n x dx
t Z t Z x a x t Z N dx
NQ Z x a x dx dx
Z Z
Q Z a

  
 



  
  




 





　　     
　　     
　　     1 2) ].
HZ N
 (5.3) 
( )HP Z is the probability of encounter between a carnivore and a herbivore in the natural 
habitat during one year. I can use the envelope theorem for the comparative static analysis. 
 
Proposition 7 (Comparative static analysis with respect to the urban boundary).  
(i) Herbivores: When ( )HP Z > 0, then 2 0H
dN
dZ
 . When ( )HP Z < 0, if 
3 3 3 2 3
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0H H H HP Z Q Z M Z  
 
       , then 
2 ( )0H
dN
dZ
  . 
(ii) Carnivores: If either 2 ( ) 0H
b
Z


   or 3 ( ) 0H
b
Z


   (i.e. either the increase 
(decrease) in the herbivore’s net offspring or the increase (decrease) in the carnivore’s net 
offspring with respect to the urban boundary is large enough), then 3 ( ) 0H
dN
dZ
  .   
Proof of Proposition 7. See Appendix 5-A. || 
 
An intuitive explanation for the result for (i) is given as follows. When the city size 
expands, which implies the natural habitat shrinks and plants disappear at ZH, herbivores will 
spend more time at every location to compensate for plants that cannot be eaten at the area 
converting from the habitat to the residential area. At the same time, carnivores cannot 
encounter herbivores at ZH. Thus, the probability of encountering between a herbivore and a 
carnivore across the habitat, ( )HP Z , becomes either high or low. When the probability 
becomes high, the carnivore’s amount of predation in the habitat increases. Thus, the number 
of herbivores decreases. In contrast, when the carnivore’s amount of predation in the habitat 
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decreases, the change in the number of herbivores depends on the carnivore’s amount of 
predation in the city. The carnivore’s amount of predation is increased by the city size 
expansion. If total changes in the amount of carnivore’s predation in both the city and the 
natural habitat are positive (i.e. the increase in the amount of carnivore’s predation in the city 
is larger than the decrease in that in the natural habitat), then the number of herbivores 
decreases, and vice versa. 
An intuitive explanation for the result for (ii) carnivores depends on the changes in net 
offspring of both animals. 3 0H
b
Z


  means a case in which carnivores are able to eat a lot 
in the city and the residents or city governments do not substantially eliminate carnivores. If 
it is the case, the number of carnivore increases. 2 0H
b
Z


  means a case where there are 
plentiful plants right next to the urban boundary (which is important food supply sources for 
herbivores), but they are destroyed by the urban development. Then, herbivores will spend 
more time exploring foods, which leads to increasing the herbivore’s risk of encountering 
carnivores. Consequently, the net offspring of herbivores is greatly reduced. So, the number 
of carnivores is reduced due to the loss of their food sources. 
 
Corollary 1. Suppose that the number of plants that grows naturally without being planted 
by humans 1( )x is uniform across the natural habitat. If 2 0H
b
Z
 

, then 3 0H
dN
dZ
 .  
 
This assertion implies that if 1( )x  is uniform across the habitat, the change in the 
number of carnivores depends only on the change in the herbivore’s offspring. As I 
mentioned in Proposition 7(ii), the change in the number of carnivores depends on the 
changes in net offspring of both animals. When 1( )x  is uniform across the habitat, the 
time density of carnivores is uniform across the habitat. Then, the change in ( )HP Z  is 
canceled, that is, the carnivore’s amount of predation in the habitat does not change. Hence, 
the carnivore’s net offspring always increases because they can eat more foods in the city as 
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the city size expands. In contrast, the change in the herbivore’s net offspring is ambiguous. If 
the herbivore’s amount of foods available in the rest of the habitat is larger than the loss of 
plants because of converting the habitat into the residential area, then the herbivore’s net 
offspring increases. This leads to increasing the number of carnivores.  
   Next I explore the effects of planting plants by humans on the number of animals.  
 
Proposition 8 (Comparative static analysis with respect to the number of plants).  
(i) Herbivores: 2
1
0dN
d
 . (ii) Carnivores: 3
1
0dN
d
 . 
Proof of Proposition 8. See Appendix 5-A. || 
 
This assertion says that as nutrients for plants increase, the steady-state population of 
herbivores will not change, but carnivores will increase. An intuitive explanation for this 
result is that as the nutrients increases, the offspring of herbivores increases, which is 
completely eaten by carnivores because carnivore can eat them without risk in the natural 
habitat. The steady-state population of herbivores thus does not change. In contrast, the 
number of carnivores just depends on the amount of predation because they are a top 
predator. Since the predation increases as the number of plants increases, the number of 
carnivore increases. 
 
5.2 Stability of the population equilibrium 
In this subsection, I investigate the local stability analysis of equilibrium point. Remember 
that the dynamic system of carnivores and herbivores (5.1):  
 
3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
( ) ,
( ( ) ) .
H
H
N PN N Q M N
N Q a Z N N PN N m N
  
  
  
   

  
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The steady state population equilibrium of carnivores and herbivores, * * *3 2( ,  )N NN , are 
derived from 3 2 0N N    such that none of the species are extinct. With the envelope 
theorem, I linearize 3N  and 2N  in the neighborhood of 
*N , i.e.  
 
* *
3 23 2
3 3
3 2
N N N N
d N N
dt N N
   
  
 
 
, 
* *
3 23 2
2 2
3 2
N N N N
d N N
dt N N
   
  
 
 
, 
where 0   and 0   are arbitrarily small. In the matrix form, I can obtain  
 
*
3 3 3
* *
2 2 2 2 2 1 2( )
H
B
b PNd
dt PN b Q Z N
 
   

              
.                (5.4) 
Therefore, I can obtain  
 
 
        
* *
3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2
0 00  in the steady state
2* * * * *
3 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2
0 00
trace ( ) ( ) 0,
det ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
H H
H H H H
B b b Q Z N Q Z N
B b b Q Z N P Z N P Z N P Z N N
   
     
 
 
     
     
 
 


　
 
Then, the eigenvalues have negative real parts. Thus, I can obtain the following. 
 
Theorem 2. In the situation where carnivores encroach into a city, if neither *3N  nor 
*
2N  
is extinct, then *N is locally asymptotically stable.  
 
The stability condition says that the population equilibrium is stable even if the policy 
variable changes, as long as both *3N  and 
*
2N  are positive. Eichner and pethig (2006) 
showed that carnivores are extinct by the urban expansion, and their dynamic system reaches 
a new equilibrium where herbivores and plants coexist.24 In this paper, I can obtain 
*
0HZ
 

N . So, the equilibrium will be unstable if either carnivores or herbivores are extinct 
by the urban expansion.  
                                                   
24 Eichner and pethig (2006) did not analyze the stability of the equilibrium. 
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5.3 Second-best land use policies  
5.3.1 Social welfare function and the Lagrangian function  
I now turn to analyze how we should impose two land-use policies under the laissez-faire 
equilibrium. The welfare level depends on the policies implemented by the government. The 
social welfare W is composed of the total utility of households that is same as (4.1). The 
optimal urban boundary regulation and plant density control are given by the following 
maximization problem:  
 
3 3 3 3
2 1
* *
1
, , , , ( ), ( ),
( ), ( ,
,
)  , , 
[ ,  ( )] arg max
H A H
A H
H
V Q M P t x t x
t x n x Z X
Z n x W


N
　  
s.t. (2.7), (2.9), (2.11), (2.12), (2.15), (2.19)–(2.26), (2.28)–(2.31), and (3.3)–(3.7). 
I obtain the social optimal solution using the Lagrangian function, 
1 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 2
3
0
0
[ ( ( ), ( )) ] [ ( ( ), ( )) ]
( )[ ( ) ] ( )[ ( ) ] ( ( ) )
[ ( ) ] ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
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H H h
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X
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ZX
Z Z
Z Z
N V
L r G x I x r dx r G x I x r dx N
x v x V dx x v x V dx N A pa x dx
S n x dx N s x x a x t x N n x dx
t
S

  
 
 
         
     
     

 
  
 
1 2 3 3 3 3 3
3 2 2
2 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2
3
3 2 3 2 2
)) ( )
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( ( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ), ( ))
( )
( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( )
H H
A A H A
H H
h h
A H
h
A
H
A A
H H
Z
Z
Z Z
Z Z
X
Z n x dx m M Q m
N S N
t x dx t Z t x dx
t x n G x I x t x n G x I x
x
x n G x I x t Z N
 
 
   

  
            
     
 
  
   

 
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
3 3 3 3 3 3 2
3 3 3 3 3 2
( ) ( )[ ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( )
( ( ) ( ) ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))]
( )[ ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ), ( ))]
A H A H A H A
A H H
h
H H H
h
H
A
H
HA H
H
Z
Z
Z
Z Z Z
Z X X
dx
x n x t Z t Z t Z t x N dx
T t x dx t x dx x M x x t x n G x I x dx
x Q x t x t x n G x I x
     
  
 
     
    
 


   
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HZ
X
dx
 (5.5) 
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where ,  1( )x , 2 ( )x ,  , 1S , 1( ),s x  ,iS  ( )i x , 3 , 3 ( )x , and 3( )x  (  2,  3i ) 
are Lagrangian multipliers, 1 1( ) ( ) ( )G x v x E  N ,  2 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HG x v x g t x N E   N , and 
( ) ( )I x w A x   . The boundary condition is given by 3 ( ) 0Ht X  . The Lagrangian 
considers (2.9) and (2.19) by substituting them into (2.20) and (2.21), and considers (2.30) 
and (3.3) by substituting them into (3.4). In addition, I consider residential areas with 
carnivores and without carnivores by separating (2.15) and (2.30) into those associated with 
areas with carnivores and without carnivores. I consider 22 2( ) ( )
A A H
A H
Tt x t Z
Z Z
 

. I 
divide the original Lagrangian function by the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to (2.15), 
 , to represent it in monetary terms. To obtain the first order conditions, I integrate the 
Lagrangian by parts. The modified Lagrangian function and the first order conditions are 
found in Appendix 5-B.  
 
5.3.2 Shadow price of the animals at an optimal allocation 
I first derive the sign of the shadow price of herbivores S2 (i.e., Lagrange multiplier S2) and 
carnivores S3 (i.e., Lagrange multiplier S3) because they have important roles in determining 
the optimal city size as well as the optimal plant density. In other words, the animal 
populations are changed by the land use polices. To achieve the second-best optimum, we 
have to understand welfare effects of the population change.  
 
Proposition 9.  Under optimal land use policies, at an optimal interior allocation, the 
shadow price of carnivores S3 and herbivores S2 are respectively given by 
 
3 2 3
3
[a] Benefit arising from [b] Humans' aggregate disutility
      ecosystem services
0
( ) ( )Hh
h
HZN E gS x t x dx
N M


  
  
,            (5.6) 
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2 1 2 1
2
2 3
[d] Cost due to decreasing plants
[c] Benefit arising from 
      ecosystem services
[e] Benefit of improving  human's 
     utility due t
( ) ( )
( )[ ( )
A Hh
h
A
H
Z
Z
N ES t Z s x dx
N
gx x N
M


 
 




　 　
　　 33
3
o decreasing carnivore's [f] Benefit or costs due to 
     time density within the city     decreasing the number of 
    carnivores
]
( )A
H
A
H
Z
ZX
Z
NS dx
t x dx

 
      (5.7) 
where 2
3 3 3 3 3
( )( ) 0
( )[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))]
A H
H H H
h
t Zx
n x t x t x t x

 
  
 
. Thus, S2 and S3 can be either 
positive or negative. 
Proof of Proposition 9.  See Appendix 5-C. || 
 
In (5.6), the shadow price of carnivores is composed of an increase in the quality of 
ecosystem services resulting from an increase in carnivores and an increase in the humans’ 
risk of encountering carnivores in the city. S3 is positive (negative) if term [a] is greater (less) 
than term [b] on the RHS.  
In (5.7), the shadow price of herbivores is more complex than that of carnivores because 
the change in the number of herbivores in natural habitats affects the time density of 
carnivores within the city. The marginal increase in the number of herbivores becomes better 
in the quality of ecosystem services (term [c]) but causes a decline in the number of plants 
(term [d]). These effects appear in the model without considering the encroachment of 
carnivores.  
However, considering the encroachment of carnivores and the food chain, we can obtain 
the following effects: term [e] and term [f]. From the equilibrium conditions (3.5) and (3.6), 
the time density of carnivores decreases in the city and increases in the natural habitat due to 
the marginal increase in the number of herbivores. This causes two externalities: the humans’ 
aggregate disutility of encountering carnivores is alleviated (term [e]); the number of 
carnivores decreases in the steady state (term [f]). The reason of getting term [f] is that the 
61 
 
carnivore’s consumption of human-related foods decreases because the time density of 
carnivores in the city decreases. The change in the number of herbivores due to the change in 
the time density of carnivore is canceled by the envelope theorem.  
In summary, in the situation where carnivores are entering the city, the change in the 
number of herbivores causes not only an increase in biodiversity and the reduction of plants 
but also externalities associated with changes in the time density of carnivores. If the 
encroachment by carnivores has devastating effects on humans, the reduction of carnivores 
is positive externalities (i.e. S3 is negative, the sign of term [f] is positive). 
 
5.3.3 Optimal plant density control  
Next, I will consider how we should control plant density at each location in natural habitats.  
 
Proposition 10. When the plant density at any [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z  is marginally increased, the 
optimal plant density n1(x) at any [ ,  ]H Ax Z Z  should satisfy  
      

3
3
1 1
 
[i] Cost for planting 
     additional plants [g] Benefit arising from [h] Benefit or cost due to 
     increasing carnivores     ecosystem services
( )
hN E NS p
N n x
  
  
.       (5.8) 
Proof of Proposition 10.  See Appendix 5-C. || 
 
An intuitive interpretation is straightforward. At an optimal interior allocation, when 
planting additional plants at x, the quality of ecosystem services increases, and humans have 
to pay the cost for planting additional plants. Term [g] is the marginal benefit of enriching 
the quality of ecosystem services, and term [i] is the marginal costs of planting. In addition, 
the additional planting improves herbivores’ efficiency of eating plants. From (2.20), this 
improvement increases the number of carnivores. Since S3 can be either positive or negative, 
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term [h] represents the marginal benefit if S3 is positive, and it is the marginal cost if S3 is 
negative. 
 
5.3.4 Optimal urban boundary regulation  
Finally, I investigate how we should modify the laissez-faire market equilibrium city size. 
The primary purpose of this section is to show that the optimal city size can be larger or 
smaller than the equilibrium city size depending on the situation. This result was 
unobtainable in the study of Eichner and Pethig (2006). They state that the optimal city size 
is only smaller than the market equilibrium city size because of external benefits, which is 
caused by an increase in the size of the habitat to enrich the quality of ecosystem services.  
In the current study, there are three situations different from the previous study: (i) when 
the city size expands, the population of carnivores can either decrease or increase; (ii) the 
shadow price of both animals can be either positive or negative depending on the situation, 
as shown in Proposition 1; (iii) the city government simultaneously controls the plant density 
at each location within the habitat. So when regulating the urban boundary, the cost for 
controlling the plant changes because the size of the habitat changes. This situation occurs 
because the encroachment of carnivores into the residential areas has negative effects on 
humans’ utility, and most importantly the level of externalities depends on the location. 
Urban land expansion can thus either decrease or increase the social welfare. In this sense, 
the optimal city size can be larger or smaller than the equilibrium city size. A more detailed 
reason for this argument is discussed below. 
The second best optimal condition with respect to the city size can be obtained from that 
with respect to the city boundary ZH, which can be given as follows. 
 
Proposition 11 (The second-best optimal city size). When the city size marginally increases, 
the optimal location of city boundary satisfies  
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3
1 3
1
 
[k] Saving the cost 
[l] Benefit or cost of changing     of controlling [j] Cost due to     the popu     the plant density      decreasing plants     
( ) ( ) ( )H H HhH H
N E dNr Z r n Z pa Z S
N dZ
   
 
2
2
[m] Benefit or cost of decreasing
lation of carnivores      the population of herbivores
H
dNS
dZ

 
, 
(5.9) 
where 3H
N
Z


 ⋛ 0 and 2 0H
N
Z
 

 hold.25 Therefore, the optimal city size can be larger or 
smaller than the market equilibrium city size. 
Proof of Proposition 11.  See Appendix 5-C. || 
 
In (5.9), ( )Hr Z  is the land rent at the urban boundary. At the market equilibrium, 
( )H Hr Z r . Hence, if the RHS of (5.9) is positive (negative), the optimal city size is larger 
(smaller) than the equilibrium city size.  
Each term on the RHS of (5.9) represents the externalities resulting from the change in 
the city size. When ZH increases by a small amount (i.e. the natural habitat shrinks), plants at 
ZH will disappear, whereas the humans do not have to pay for planting plants at ZH. Term [j] 
represents the marginal cost of a deterioration in the quality of ecosystem services. Term [k] 
is the marginal benefit of saving the cost of controlling plant density at ZH. 
In addition, the change in city size affects the populations of both carnivores and 
herbivores: 3H
N
Z


 ⋛ 0 and 2 0H
N
Z
 

. Although I have the same result as Eichner and Pethig 
(2006) in which the numbers of herbivores is decreased by expanding the city size, I have a 
different result that the effect of expanding city size on the population of carnivores can be 
either positive or negative.   
When the city expands, the plants will disappear at ZH. Then, herbivores will not feed on 
plants at ZH. So, the herbivores’ offspring will decrease. On the other hand, they face less 
risk of encountering carnivores at ZH, which leads to increasing the herbivores’ offspring. 
                                                   
25 “ ⋛ ” implies that the sign can be either positive or negative. The intuitive reason of 3 HN Z  ⋛ 0 and 
2
HN Z  < 0 is given by eqs. (5C.5) and (5C.6) in Appendix 5-C. 
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From the steady state population equilibrium of carnivore (2.20), the change in the 
herbivores’ offspring leads to both increasing and decreasing carnivores. Thus, when the city 
size is marginally increased, the change in the population of carnivores is ambiguous. 
As in Proposition 9, S3 and S2 can be positive or negative depending on the situation. If 
S3 is positive,  3 3 HS dN dZ  indicates that the marginal increase (decrease) in carnivores 
can be interpreted as the marginal social benefit (cost). If S3 is negative, the marginal 
increase (decrease) in carnivores can be interpreted as the marginal social cost (benefit). 
Similarly,  2 2 HS dN dZ  says that the marginal decrease in herbivores can be interpreted 
as the marginal social cost if S2 is positive, and it can be interpreted as the marginal social 
benefit if S2 is negative.  
 
5.4 Numerical examples in the second-best setting 
There are two purposes of our numerical simulations. One is to confirm the theoretical 
property that differs from the results of Eichner and Pethig (2006). In other words, I will 
show a numerical example where the second-best optimal city size is larger than the 
equilibrium city size. The other is to show how close the level of social welfare approaches 
the first-best optimum by the second-best policies. First-best optimum, defined in section 4, 
means that the social planner includes all animals’ behavior and transactions in her 
optimization problem. In other words, all externalities arising from the time density of 
animals and human population density are adjusted with Pigovian tax or subsidy. One is 
carnivores’ encroachment into the city that adversely affects human’s utility, and the other is 
biodiversity (i.e. the change in the number of carnivores, herbivores, and plants). The 
first-best optimal conditions with respect to the time density of animals and the human 
population density are obtained from section 4 or Yoshida and Kono (2017a).26  
                                                   
26 The first best optimum I compare with the second best optimum in this simulation is usually impractical (but 
ideal) optimum because we cannot efficiently allocate all natural resources including animals’ behavior. 
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In this simulation, almost settings are same as the subsection 5.4. Different settings I use 
are given as follows. The cost of housing land development rH is set as US$15,000. The 
preference parameters of the households’ utility are set as 1 2 3 300      and c = 5,000. 
Finally, 1( )x  is set 5.4 for ( ,  20]Hx Z , 6.3 for (20,  30]x , 7.2 for (30,  40]x , 8.1 
for (40,  50]x , and 9.0 for (50,  60]x .  
To explore how proposed land use policies improve the social welfare, I show 
laissez-faire, optimal plant density with UGB regulation (the second-best optimum), optimal 
plant density without UGB regulation, UGB regulation without controlling plant densities, 
and the first-best optimum. The numerical results are presented in Table 3. The numerical 
results of endogenous variables such as r(x), nh(x), 3 ( )
Ht x , 3 ( )
At x , 2 ( )
At x , and 1( )n x  are 
presented in Appendix 5-D. 
I first focus on the laissez-faire equilibrium and the second-best optimum as shown in 
first and second rows of Table 2(i). As shown in the columns of UGB, the urban boundary is 
located at x = 18 at the equilibrium; the urban boundary is located at x = 20 at the 
second-best optimum. As demonstrated in Proposition 11, the optimal city size can be larger 
than the market equilibrium city size. For those parameter values, the assertion is verified by 
the results in Table 3(i). With regard to welfare gains, optimal plant density without UGB 
regulation and UGB regulation without controlling plant densities obtain 70% and 62% of 
the gain of the first-best optimum, respectively. The combination of the plant density control 
and UGB regulation obtains 94% of the first-best welfare gain. 
Next, I consider another city with natural habitats where parameter i  = 1000, and 
1( )x  is set 6.6 for ( ,20]Hx Z , 7.7 for (20,  30]x , 8.8 for (30,  40]x  , 9.9 for 
(40,  50]x  , and 10.1 for (50,  60]x  . This situation indicates a higher value of ecosystem 
services for humans and has more abundant naturally-growing plants. The other parameters 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, I use the ideal first-best optimum as a comparable target to know how much the second best policies 
approach the ideal first-best optimum in terms of the social welfare.  
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are same as in the previous case. For these parameters, the urban boundary is located at x = 
18 at the equilibrium; the urban boundary is located at x = 8 at the second-best optimum. 
This implies that the second-best optimal city size is smaller than the equilibrium city size. 
With regard to welfare gains, optimal plant density without UGB regulation obtains 0.1% of 
the gain of the first-best optimum, and UGB regulation without controlling plant densities 
obtains 38% of the gain of the first-best optimum. The reason why the welfare gain of the 
optimal plant density without UGB regulation is so small is that the size of the natural 
habitat does not change and the plant density that grows naturally without being planted by 
humans 1( )x  is close to the optimal level before the plant density control by the 
government. Thus, the welfare almost remain unchanged. In contrast, the combination of 
plant density control and UGB regulation obtains 90% of the first-best welfare gain because 
a large natural habitat is created (i.e. 10 km2 of the residential land are converged to the 
natural habitat) by the urban boundary regulation, and the plant density at the created habitat 
is adjusted to the optimal level. This result says that even if the government optimally adjusts 
the urban boundary, the welfare gain is small unless the plant density is adjusted optimally in 
the natural habitat whose area is changed by the urban boundary regulation. 
As shown in section 4 or Yoshida and Kono (2017a), whether the optimal city size is 
larger or smaller than the market equilibrium city size depends on the relative size of i  
and c. When i  is large (i.e. the value of ecosystem services is high), the city government 
should shrink the city size in order to enrich the quality of ecosystem services. On the other 
hand, when i  is small, the humans’ fear of encountering carnivores is more influential on 
the welfare. Therefore, it should expand the city to lower the number of carnivores and the 
length of time carnivores stay in the city. 
According to these simulations, the combination of UGB regulation and the plant 
density control is very effective in both simulations.  
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Table 3. Numerical results (The second-best optimum) 
 (i) c = 5000, 300  : The optimal city size is larger than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size 
 Welfare 
gain (%) 
UGB 
(km) N3 N2 N1 ( )
H
hcM Z  
3
1
i i
i
N

  
Laissez-faire - 18 1 11 31 312 12749 
Optimal plant density  
with UGB (Second-best) 94 20 2 11 34 419 14245 
Optimal plant density 
without UGB 70 18 3 11 36 706 14903 
UGB without controlling 
plant densities 62 24 0.9 10 27 7 11478 
First-best 100 20 2 11 34 405 14323 
 
(ii) c = 5000, 1000  : The optimal city size is smaller than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size 
 Welfare 
gain (%) 
UGB 
(km) N3 N2 N1 ( )
H
hcM Z  
3
1
i i
i
N

  
Laissez-faire - 18 3 11 37 785 51288 
Optimal plant density  
with UGB (Second-best) 90 8 4 13 51 2339 68484 
Optimal plant density 
without UGB 0.1 18 4 11 41 1028 56704 
UGB without controlling 
plant densities 38 8 2 13 44 1437 58847 
First-best 100 8 4 14 51 792 69108 
 
Note: ( )HhcM Z  indicates the human’s welfare loss due to encounters with carnivores at the city 
boundary. 
3
1
i i
i
N

  indicates the value of ecosystem services from three species. 
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Appendix 5-A. Proof of Proposition 7, 8, and Corollary 1. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The dynamic system of two animals (5.1) can be written as  
3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( )( ( ) ) ( ) ( ) 0.
A H A H H H
H H A H A
A
H
A
H
Z
Z
Z
Z
N t Z t x dx Q Z M Z m
Q Z a Z N N t Z t x dx m
  
  
   
   


       (5A.1) 
Totally differentiating (5.1) with respect to N2, N3, and policy variable ZH yields 
3
3 2 3 2
3 2
2 2 1 2 2 3
( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
A H A
H
H
H A H A
H
A
A
H
A
H
Z
Z
Z
Z
b
t Z t x dx dN Z dZ
dN bQ Z t Z t x dx
Z

  

                     


    (5A.2) 
where 
3
3 2 3 3 2 3
0 0 0
3 2 3 2 3 2
0 0
3 3 3 3 3
0
(Z ) (Z ) (Z )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(Z ) (Z )[ ( ( )) ( )]
H H H H
H
or
A H A A H A H
or
H H H H H H
h
A
H
Z
Z
b P N Q M
Z
t Z t x dx t Z t Z N
t n t Z Z
  

   
  
 

    

    
 

 


　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　
 (5A.3) 
and  
1
2 1
2 2 1 2 2 2 3
0 00 0
0
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1
0
3
2 3 3
( ) ( ) (Z )
( )( ( ) ) ( ) ( )
1 ( ) ( ) .
H H H
H H
oror
H H H H
N
A A H
A H A H
A
H
Z
Z
b NQ Z N Q Z P N
Z Z
Q Z a Z N Q Z a Z
N t x dx t Z
Z Z Z Z
  
  

  

 
   
 
   
     
 
 
 
 
＝
　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　
 (5A.4) 
Determinant of matrix A is 
2
3 2 2 3( ) ( ) 0
A H A
A
H
Z
Z
A t Z t x dx          (5A.5)  
Using Cramer's rule,  
00 0
3
2 3 3 3 3 3
2
3 2 32 2 3
0
1 ( (Z ) (Z ) (Z ))
( ) ( )( ) ( )
or
H H H HH
H
A H AA H A
H
AA
HH
ZZ
ZZ
b
dN P Q MZ
bdZ A t Z t x dxt Z t x dx
Z
  

      
 
 

.  (5A.6) 
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Similarity, 
  
3
3 2 3
3 2 3
3 2 3 2 2 1
2 002 2 1 0 0 0 00
( ) ( )
1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
A H A
H
A H A H
H H H
H
or orH
A
H A
H
Z
Z Z
Z
bt Z t x dx
dN b bZ t Z t x dx Q Z
bdZ A A Z ZQ Z
Z

  
     
                

 
 
(5A.7) 
From these equations, I can obtain Proposition 7.|| 
 
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose 1( )x  is uniform across the natural habitat. Then, from (3.7), 
the carnivore’s time density is equal across the habitat. Thus,  
3 3
0
1 1(Z ) ( ) ( ) 0H A A HA H A H
A
H
Z
Z
P t x dx t Z
Z Z Z Z

       
.  (5A.8) 
Then, I can obtain 
 
3
3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
0
(Z ) (Z ) (Z ) (Z )[ ( ( )) ( )] 0H H H H H H H H HhH
b Q M t n t Z Z
Z
     

      
 
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2 1
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
0 0
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H H H H HH H
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b NQ Z N Q Z Q Z N Q Z a Z
Z Z
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 

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 
   
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＝  ⋚ 0.   (5A.10) 
From (5A.7), if 2 0H
b
Z
 

, then 3 0H
dN
dZ
 . || 
 
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof of Proposition 8 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 7. 
Total differentiating (5.1) with respect to N2, N3, and policy variable 1  yields 
3 2 3 2
1
2 23
2 2 1 2 2 3
( ) ( ) 0 0
.
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
A H A
H
H A H A
A
A
H
A
H
Z
Z
Z
Z
t Z t x dx dN
d
Q ZdNQ Z t Z t x dx


  

 
         
     




  (5A.11) 
Using Cramer's rule,  
2
1 2 2 2 2 3
0 01 0
( ) ( ) ( )H A H A
A
H
Z
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dN
d A Q Z t Z t x dx  
 
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,   (5A.12) 
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3 2 23 2 3
1
2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
1 ( )( ) ( ) 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
HA H A
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 
. (5A.13) 
Therefore, I can obtain Proposition 8. || 
 
Appendix 5-B. The Lagrangian function and first-order conditions (the 
second best optimum) 
Integrating the Lagrangian function (5.5) by parts, I can obtain 
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where 1 1( ) ( ) ( )G x v x E  N ,  2 2 3 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( )HG x v x g t x N E   N , and ( )I x w A     
( )x .  
Differentiating (5B.1) with respective variables, I can obtain (5B.2)–(5B.17): The first 
order conditions with respect to 3 ( )
HQ x  and 3( )M x  are analogous to Appendix 3-A, i.e. 
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(3A.7)–(3A.8) hold. The different first order conditions are given as follows: 
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A I
     
   (5B.11) 
10 : ( ) 0( )
L p s x
a x
    

,  (5B.12) 
2 3
3
10 : ( ) 0H
L S X
Q P
    

,         (5B.13) 
3
2 3
3 3
0 : ( ) 0L S X
M P
 

   

,  (5B.14) 
3 3 3 3 3 3
3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3
2
0 : ( ) ( )[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))]
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 0,
H H H
hH
H H H
h h h
G
h h
L x n x t x t x t x
t x
x t x n x x t x t x n x x x n x
r g gN x N
G M M
    
     
    

  
     
  
　　　　　
　　　　　
  (5B.15) 
3 2
2 2 3 3 3 2
3
3 3
0 : ( ) 0 
( ) ( ) ( )
A
A A
A A
H H
Z Z
Z Z
L N Nx N S S
t x t x dx t x dx
        
  
,             (5B.16) 
2
2
0 : ( ) 0 
A
H
Z
Z
L x dx

   
  ,         (5B.17) 
where 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2
3 3 3 3 3 3
2
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
H Hh
G
H H H Hh
nx x t x t x x
G
n x t x t x x x t x
G
      
   
      
    
　　　　
 (5B.18) 
and 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3
0
0
( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
H Hh
I
H H H Hh
H
H
Z
Z
nx t x t x x dx
I
n x t x t x x x t x
I
      
   
      
    

　　　　
 (5B.19) 
The first order conditions with respect to Lagrangian multipliers are suppressed because they 
are obvious. I use the following expressions: 1 ( )r I f x   . 
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Appendix 5-C. Proof of Proposition 9–11. 
Proof of Proposition 9.  First, I will obtain the sign of S3. Integrating both sides of (5B.16), 
we can obtain  
3 2
2 3 2 3 3 2
3 3
( ) [ ] 0
( ) ( )A A
A A
H HA A
H H
Z Z
Z ZZ Z
Z Z
N N
N x dx S S dx
t x dx t x dx
        
 
. (5C.1) 
By using (5B.17),  
3 2
3 3 2
3 3
0
( ) ( )A A
A A
H H
Z Z
Z Z
N N
S S
t x dx t x dx
   
 
. (5C.2) 
Substituting (5C.2) into (5B.16) yields 2( ) 0x  . Solving (5B.5) for ( )G x  and 
substituting ( )G x  and 2( ) 0x   into (5B.6) using (5B.2), (5B.4), and the fact that 
3
E
N


 
is independent of location x yields  
3 2 3
3
0 0
( ) ( )Hh
h
HZ
X
N E gS x t x dx
N M


 
  
  
,                 
where 2 ( ) 0x   simply using the Kuhn-Tucker condition. If the first term is bigger than 
the second term, then S3 is positive. Otherwise, it is negative. 
Next, I will obtain the sign of S2. From Lemma A1 with (5B-13) and (5B.14), I can  
obtain 23( )
Sx
P
    and 33 2
3
( )x S
P


 . Substituting these equations and 
3 2
3 3 2
3 3( ) ( )
A A
A A
H H
Z Z
Z Z
N NS S
t x dx t x dx
  
 
 into (5B.15) and using (5B.5) and equilibrium 
conditions (3.5) and (3.6) yields 
3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
3
( ) ( )[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] ( ) 0
( )
H H H
h
A h
A
H
Z
Z
N gx n x t x t x t x S x N
Mt x dx
         

.  (5C.3) 
where 3 3 3 3 3( ) [2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))] 0
H H Hx t x t x t x      . Substituting (5B.5) and (5C.3) into (5B.7) 
and then arranging it using (5B.2), (5B.4), and the fact that 
2
E
N


 is independent of location 
x yields 
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3
2 2 1 1 2 3 3
2
3
0
0
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ] ,
( )
A Hh
Ah
HA
AH
H
Z Z
ZZ X
Z
N E g NS t Z s x dx x x N S dx
N M t x dx
  



    
    
 
where 2
3 3 3 3 3
( )( ) 0
( )[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))]
A H
H H H
h
t Zx
n x t x t x t x

 
  
 
. From (5B.3) and (5B.11), 1  . So, 
from (5B.11), 1 ( ) 0s x p  . Therefore, the sign of S2 can be either positive or negative. || 
 
Proof of Proposition 10. Combining (5B.2), (5B.4), (5B.5), and (5B.8) yields 1
1
hN ES
N


. 
Substituting 2( ) 0x  , 1
1
hN ES
N


, and 1( )s x p  into (5B.9) yields (5.8): 
 
2 2 2 2
3
1 2
0 0
( ) ( ( ))A H A HhN E t Z t ZS p
N P
 
 
 
  
 
, 
 
where 3 2 2 2 2
1 2
( ) ( ( )) 0
( )
A H A HN t Z t Z
n x P
 

  

. || 
 
Proof of Proposition 11. The optimal location of the city boundary is determined by (5B.10). 
Substituting 1
1
hN ES
N


, 1  , 23( )H
SZ
P
   , and 33 2
3
( )HZ S
P


 into (5B.10) 
yields  
 
1
1
2
3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 3
2
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
2
3 3 2 3 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 0.
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H H Hh
H
A H
A H H H A H
H H H H H H H H H H A H
h h
A H A
A
H
Z
Z
N Er Z r n Z pa Z
N
t ZS t Z n Z Z N t Z N
P
t Z Z n Z t Z Z n Z t Z t Z N
S
P t Z t x N dx

    

    
 
  

     
   
  
  
 
(5C.4) 
Arranging (5C.4) yields the optimal condition with respect to the urban boundary (5.9):  
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3
1 3
1
 
[k] Saving the cost 
[l] Benefit or cost of changing    of controlling [j] Cost due to     the popul    the plant density       decreasing plants     
( ) ( ) ( )H H HhH H
N E dNr Z r n Z pa Z S
N dZ
   
 
2
2
[m] Benefit or cost of decreasing
ation of carnivores      the population of herbivores
H
dNS
dZ

 
, 
where  
3 2
2 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 1
2 [1] 0 [3] 0[2] 0
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
A H
A H H A H A H
H
dN t Z t Z n Z t Z N t Z N
dZ P
    

 
 
    
  
   ⋛ 0 (5C.5) 
 
and 
 
3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3
[4] 0 [5] 0 [6] 0
02
3
3 2 2 3
[7] 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
H H H H H H A H H H H H
h h
H
A H A
A
H
Z
Z
t Z Z n Z t Z t Z N t Z Z n Z
dN
dZ P
t Z N t x dx
    


  


  



 


  


0



 

 
 
. 
 (5C.6) 
 
This is the targeted equation. 
The intuitive reason of 3H
dN
dZ
 ⋛ 0 is given as follows. When the city expands, the plants 
will disappear at ZH. Then, herbivores will not feed on plants at ZH, which is represented by 
term [1], and they will not meet carnivores at ZH, which is represented by term [2]. Besides 
that, since 2 2( ) ( )
A A H
A H
Tt x t Z
Z Z
 

, 2 ( )
At x  is increased by the urban land expansion (i.e. 
2 ( ) 0
A Ht Z  ). This causes a decrease in plant consumed by the herbivore in the next time 
period, which is represented by term [3]. As shown in (2.21), term [1] and term [3] lead to a 
decreasing number of carnivores, and term [2] leads to an increasing number of carnivores. 
Thus, the change in the population of carnivores due to the urban land expansion is 
ambiguous. 
The intuitive reason of 2H
dN
dZ
< 0 is given as follows. When the city expands, the 
carnivores can eat more food in the city, but cannot eat herbivores at ZH, which are 
represented by term [4] and term [5], respectively. Besides that, they will meet humans at ZH, 
that is, they will face the mortality risk, which is represented by term [6]. From a 
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combination of equilibrium conditions with respect to the carnivores’ time density at the city 
boundary, i.e. (3.5) and (3.6) at which x = ZH, an increase in carnivore’s offspring resulting 
from term [4] is larger than the decrease in carnivore’s offspring resulting from term [5] and 
term [6]. From (2.20), these circumstances cause a decreasing number of herbivores. In 
addition, since 2 ( ) 0
A Ht Z  , the herbivore will face a risk of encountering more carnivores, 
which is shown by term [7]. This also leads to decreasing number of herbivores.||  
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Appendix 5-D. Numerical results 
Table A5. Numerical results with respect to each policy 
 
(i) c = 5000, 300  : The optimal city size is larger than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size 
Laissez-faire Optimal plant density with UGB  (Second-best) 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 22620  2.83  - - - 2 21111  2.64  - - - 
4 21382  2.67  - - - 4 19957  2.49  - - - 
6 20213  2.53  - - - 6 18865  2.36  - - - 
8 15964  2.00  0.055  - - 8 14295  1.79  0.035  - - 
18 15964  2.00  0.055  - - 18 14295  1.79  0.035  - - 
20 - - 0.000  0.024  1  20 14295  1.79  0.035  - - 
30 - - 0.010  0.024  6  30 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
40 - - 0.016  0.024  7  40 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
50 - - 0.021  0.024  8  50 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
60 - - 0.027  0.024  9  60 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
 
Optimal plant density without UGB UGB without controlling plant densities 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 23289  2.91  - - - 2 20749  2.59  - - - 
4 22015  2.75  - - - 4 19614  2.45  - - - 
6 20811  2.60  - - - 6 18541  2.32  - - - 
8 15648  1.96  0.051  - - 8 14442  1.81  0.037  - - 
18 15648  1.96  0.051  - - 18 14442  1.81  0.037  - - 
20 - - 0.007  0.024  2  20 14442  1.81  0.037  - - 
30 - - 0.015  0.024  9  30 - - 0.012  0.025  6  
40 - - 0.015  0.024  9  40 - - 0.016  0.025  7  
50 - - 0.015  0.024  9  50 - - 0.021  0.025  8  
60 - - 0.015  0.024  9  60 - - 0.025  0.025  9  
 
First-best 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
1 23753  2.97  - - - 
3 22454  2.81  - - - 
5 21226  2.65  - - - 
7 15836  1.65  0.034  - - 
11 15836  1.65  0.034  - - 
20 15836  1.65  0.034  - - 
30 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
40 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
50 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
60 - - 0.019  0.025  9  
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 (ii) c = 5000, 1000  : Optimal city size is smaller than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size 
Laissez-faire Optimal plant density with UGB  (Second-best) 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 23423  2.93  - - - 2 46117  5.76  - - - 
4 22142  2.77  - - - 4 43594  5.45  - - - 
6 20931  2.62  - - - 6 41210  5.15  - - - 
8 15584  1.95  0.051  - - 8 29079  3.63  0.111 - - 
18 15584  1.95  0.051  - -  - - - - - 
20 - - 0.005  0.024  3  20 - - 0.013  0.019  12  
30 - - 0.013  0.024  7  30 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
40 - - 0.015  0.024  8  40 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
50 - - 0.017  0.024  10  50 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
60 - - 0.020  0.024  11  60 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
 
Optimal plant density without UGB UGB without controlling plant densities 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 23841  2.98  - - - 2 45138  5.64  - - - 
4 22537  2.82  - - - 4 42669  5.33  - - - 
6 21304  2.66  - - - 6 40335  5.04  - - - 
8 15387  1.92  0.048  - - 8 31859  3.98  0.118  - - 
18 15387  1.92  0.048  - - 11 - - - - - 
20 - - 0.009  0.024  2  20 - - 0.018  0.019  2  
30 - - 0.015  0.024  10  30 - - 0.137  0.019  3  
40 - - 0.015  0.024  10  40 - - 0.190  0.019  4  
50 - - 0.015  0.024  10  50 - - 0.242  0.019  5  
60 - - 0.015  0.024  10  60 - - 0.295  0.019  6  
 
First-best 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 50259  6.28  - - - 
4 47510  5.94  - - - 
6 44911  5.61  - - - 
8 31135  2.17  0.041  - - 
- - - - - - 
20 - - 0.018  0.019  12  
30 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
40 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
50 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
60 - - 0.019  0.019  10  
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6. Optimal extermination policy  
In this section, I investigate the optimal number of exterminating carnivores within the city, 
under the laissez-faire equilibrium. Recall that 3 3 3M N  indicates the annual number of 
exterminating carnivores in the city, where 3  is the number of exterminating carnivores 
per encounter between humans and carnivores and 3M  is the number of humans that one 
carnivore may encounter. 3M  depends on the time density of carnivore in the city. If 3  is 
large, humans try to exterminate them even if carnivores stay in the city for a short time (i.e. 
even if 3M  is small). Here, the government controls 3  at each location to optimize the 
number of exterminating carnivores in the city. Namely, 3( )x  at all [ ,  ]
Hx X Z  is a 
policy variable. As in the plant density control, residents bear the total extermination costs 
3( )e
HZ
X
p x dx , where ep  is the unit extermination cost. I can obtain the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 12. The optimal 3( )x  at any [ ,  ]
Hx X Z  should satisfy  
 
3 3
2 3 3 2
3
3
[n] Improvement of [p] Increase in the 
     human's utility      number of herbivores[o] Decrease in the 
     number of carnivores
( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ] ( )
( )
H
h
Ah
A
H
Z
Z
g N x t x n xx N S x S
M Pt x dx
 

  
 

[q] Extermination cost
ep

, (5.10) 
 
where 
3 3 3 3 3 3
( )( ) 0
[2 ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ))]H H H
xx
t x t x t x

  
  
 
. 
Proof of proposition 12. See Appendix 6. 
 
The intuitive interpretation of (5.10) is given as follows. At any location x within the city, 
when 3( )x  marginally increases by spending the extermination cost ep , the number of 
exterminating carnivores increases. At the same time, carnivores face more risk of 
exterminated by humans. Thus, the time density of carnivores decreases, which alleviates the 
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humans’ disutility of encountering carnivores (term [n]). In addition, because the carnivore’s 
consumption of human related sources of foods decreases, the number of carnivores 
decreases (term [o]). On the other hands, the time density of carnivores in the habitat 
increases. But its impacts on the number of herbivores is cancelled because of the envelop 
theorem, which means that the effect of increasing the carnivore’s offspring due to 
increasing the carnivore’s time density within the habitat and the effects of decreasing 
carnivore’s offspring due to decreasing the carnivore’s time density within the city are 
cancelled out. 
These terms may appear in the analysis of conflicts between residents and single wildlife 
creature without considering the food chain of wildlife creatures. Considering the food chain, 
however, the effects of extermination on the other species appear as term [p]. This indicates 
an increase in the number of herbivores because of exterminating their predator animals. The 
welfare effects of increasing herbivores depend on the sign of shadow price of herbivores S2. 
S2 includes the effects on the number of plants as well as carnivores. The detailed welfare 
effects of such increase are found in Proposition 9 in subsection 5.3.2. Consequently, this 
proposition states that when exterminating harmful carnivores in the city, we have to take 
into account not only the humans’ disutility but also the impacts on the other species through 
the foods chain. 
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Appendix 6. Proof of Proposition 12. 
First, I modify the Lagrangian function (5B.1) by introducing a policy variable 3( )x  and 
the per-resident extermination costs 3( )e
HZ
X
p x dx . That is, I modify (2.24) as 
3( ) ( )e h
HA
H
Z Z
Z X
pa x dx p x dx N A   , and then introducing the Lagrangian function (5B.1). 
So, we can obtain 
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X
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X
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
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 (6A.1) 
Taking partial derivative with respect to 3( )x  yields 
3 3 3
3
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
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H
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L x x n x x x t x n x p
x
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
.  (6A.2) 
The optimal condition with respect to 3 ( )
Ht x  is modified as  
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The first order conditions with respect to the other variables are analogous to those in the 
Appendix 5-B.  
Substituting 1   and 23
3
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P

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Substituting (6A.5) into (6A.4) yields  
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7. Optimal land use regulation considering biodiversity and 
human–wildlife conflicts: case of Denver  
In this section I apply the proposed model in this paper to a human–coyote conflict occurred 
in the Denver Metropolitan Area (DMA) in order to obtain the second best optimal city size 
and to measure the overall welfare effect of the urban boundary regulation in the presence of 
unpriced externalities: the conflict and biodiversity.  
 
7.1 Background of resident–coyote conflicts in Denver Metro area 
Poessel et al. (2013) researched spatial patterns of the human–coyote conflict in DMA by 
using reports for the period 2003–2010 from 16 municipalities, 5 county governments, and 
Colorado Parks and Wildlife. The reports provide information on coyote observation (signs, 
sighting, and encounters) and conflicts (incidents, pet-attacks, and human-attacks). Incidents 
mean a conflict where coyote exhibited unsafe behavior for human, such as baring teeth, as 
if they attack a human immediately. The human-attacks involve physical contacts between 
them such as a human is injured or killed by a coyote.      
Figure 5 shows the DMA map showing densities of coyote conflicts reported for 
2003–2010 across the four land use patterns (the map is obtained from Poessel et al., 2013 
and revised by myself). From the map, we can see that densities of conflicts are small near 
the urban boundary, but as they approach the city center, they become larger. After that, they 
become small again as they approach the city center．As shown in Figure 5, the development 
(residential) area of DMA is spreading concentrically from the CBD. The development area 
is contiguous to natural habitats from the North West to the South East and is contiguous to 
agricultural areas in the North East. I focus on the half circle of DMA with the natural habitat. 
I set the boundary of the development area and the natural habitat is 14km and 34km distant 
from the CBD, respectively. The boundary of carnivore’s foraging behavior toward the CBD, 
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X, is located about 6 km away from the CBD. The total number of households of the 
development area is set 563,859 that is obtained from the total number of households in 
Denver county, Lakewood city, Littleton city, Aurora city, Englewood city, Centennial city, 
and Thornton city in 2012. I divide the city into discrete areas with 2km widths.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The DMA map showing densities of coyote conflicts reported for 2003–2010 with 
the four land use patterns by Poessel et al. (2013). Star on the map indicates the location of 
the downtown of DMA. 
 
85 
 
7.2 Parameter calibration 
I calibrate parameters related with ecosystem ( i , i ,  mi ,  2,  3i , and ( )x ) so that 
the real situation in DMA can be expressed by the following dynamic system of population 
growth (6.1). In the natural habitat, coyotes eat small animals such as rabbits, mice, and 
young mule deer. Here, I focus on the coyote–deer–plants food chain.  
                
              3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) 0,
( , ) ( ) 0,
H H H H
H H
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

  (7.1) 
 
Coyotes usually give birth average six offspring, but they survive only 20% a year. So, I 
set  3 2 3( ) ( ) 1.2H H HP Z N Q Z   . As in Breck et al. (2017), 56 coyotes are exterminated to 
tackle with the resident–coyote conflict within the development area of DMA during five 
years 2009–2014; I set 3 3 3( ) 56 / 5
HM Z N  , where 3( ) 1000(14 )x x   . As in the data 
on small game statistic by Colorado Park and Wildlife, the average 2404.5 numbers of 
coyotes are also harvested by hunters in the DMA during two years 2012–2013; I set 
3 3 2404.5m N  . 
Deer hunt statistics by Colorado Park and Wildlife provides the number of harvests and 
post hunted population of deer per Deer Data Analysis Unit. I select three units (D-17, D-27 
and D-49), and I calculated the total number of deer and the total number of harvests in these 
units during 2012–2013. The total number of harvests is average 2333.5; I set 
2 2 2333.5m N  . The total number of pre-hunted population of deer is average 22433.5. 
According to the Deer hunt statistics by Colorado Park and Wildlife, a deer usually gives 
birth one offspring a year and 70% of the population is female; I set 2 2 2( , ) 0.7
HQ Z N  . 
By using above equations with the population equilibrium 2 2 23
2
Q mN
P


  and 
3 3 3 3 3
2
3
HM Q mN
P
 

  , I can obtain that the parameters ( i , i   2,  3i ) are the 
function of endogenous variables (human population density and the time density of  
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animals). As a result, the total number of coyotes is 2013 in this area. Then, substituting 
these parameters into the equilibrium conditions and calculating the endogenous variables 
yield 3 0.0186  , 103 2.96 10   , 2 0.0290  , 2 0.547  , 3 1.19m  , and 2 0.104m  .  
Deer herbivory greatly reduced the seed production and seedling recruitment of wild 
plants. Waser et al. (2014) investigated the effects of the deer herbivory on plants in the Elk 
Mountains of western Colorado. They said that plants that were exposed to deer produced on 
average less than 30 % as many as plants that were caged to exclude deer. So, I set the  
1 1 2 2
1
( ) ( ) 0.7
( )
A Hx t Z N
x
 

  , where 1 1  . 
Finally, I specify the utility function as 
3
1
( ) ( ) ln ( ) ( )h i i
i
v x C x b f x cM x N

    , 
where b, c, and i   1,  2,  3i  are positive parameters. The parameter c is set so that the 
willingness to pay per month per household for completely removing coyotes from the 
residential area is $150. The parameters i   1,  2,  3i  are set so that when carnivores, 
herbivores, and plants are extinct in DMA, the amount of declining value is respectively 
$100, $60, and $20.  
 
7.3 Results 
I calculate how the number of animals and plants, the human’s fear of encroachment by 
carnivores, and the value of biodiversity change when the urban boundary is spread outward 
by 0.5 km. I also obtain the second-best optimal location of the boundary in DMA given 
above parameters. The numerical results are shown in Table 4 and 5. There are two main 
results: (i) when the city size expands, the number of top predator animals (coyotes) 
increases; (ii) the second-best optimum city size is larger than the current (equilibrium) city 
size.  
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7.3.1 Change in the Population equilibrium 
The result (i) is a different result from Eichner and Pethig (2006), who states that when city 
size expands, the number of top predator animals is going to be extinct and the new 
population equilibrium is reached: herbivores and plants coexist. The reason why this paper 
has a new result is expressed by Corollary 1 in subsection 5.1. In contrast, the number of 
herbivores is decreased by the urban expansion.  
It is an interesting result that when expanding the city size from 142  2  km2 to 
14.52  2  km2, the number of plants increases, whereas it decreases as the city size 
expands over 14.52  2  km2. This is due to indirect effects. That is, by the first 
expansion, the number of deer decreases because of an increase in the number of carnivores. 
As the city size expands, direct effects of the urban expansion on the number of plants are 
dominant. 
 
7.3.2 Overall welfare effects 
When expanding the city size from 142  2  km2 to 14.52  2  km2, the value of 
biodiversity increases because the number of both carnivores and plants increases. As the 
city size expands over 14.52  2  km2, the number of carnivores increases, but the 
number of plants begins to decline. So, the value of biodiversity increases, but its increasing 
rate decreases. At the same time, overall welfare starts to decline because the fear of 
encroachment by carnivores continues to increase. Under above parameter settings, the city 
boundary is located 15 km away from the city center.  
This result indicates that even if the human’s fear of carnivores increases, the value of 
biodiversity may rise. Besides that, the number of plants is sensitively changed by the urban 
expansion. In other words, the number of plants depends on which effect is dominant, direct 
effects of urban expansion on plants or indirect effects on plants through a decrease in the 
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number of deer. Hence, it is necessary to design land use regulation taking these effects into 
consideration. 
 
Table 4. Numerical results (i): 
The population of wildlife and welfare effects of urban boundary regulation  
UGB 
(km) N1 N2 N3 Welfare 
Welfare from 
goods and 
housing 
Fear of 
encroachment 
by carnivore 
Biodiversity 
14 72535 22433 2013 19601 19081 1800 2320 
14.5 72785 17218 2506 20024 19418 2243 2849 
15 71902 11732 3022 20026 19769 2714 2971 
15.5 71009 5963 3563 20016 20138 3200 3098 
 
Table 5. Numerical results (ii): 
Human population density and time densities of wildlife in DMA 
UGB = 14 km UGB = 14.5 km 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 1.98×107  2469  - - - 2 2.00×107  2502 - - - 
4 1.87×107  2334  - - - 4 1.89×107  2365  - - - 
6 1.77×107  2206  - - - 6 1.79×107  2236  - - - 
8 1.33×107 1668 0.0455  - - 8 1.28×107 1600 0.0460  - - 
10 1.26×107 1574  0.0458  - - 10 1.21×107 1509  0.0463  - - 
12 1.19×107 1488 0.0459  -  -  12 1.14×107 1426 0.0464  -  - 
14 1.13×107 1407 0.0458 -  -  14.5 1.07×107 1340 0.0463 -  - 
14 - - 0.082  0.1  48  14.5 - - 0.041  0.103  49  
34 - - 0.082  0.1  48 34 - - 0.041  0.103  49  
            
UGB = 15 km UGB = 15.5 km 
x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) x r(x) nh(x) t3(x) t2(x) n1(x) 
2 2.03×107  2540  - - - 2 2.07×107  2583 - - - 
4 1.92×107  2401  - - - 4 1.95×107  2442  - - - 
6 1.82×107  2270  - - - 6 1.85×107  2309  - - - 
8 1.23×107 1533 0.0465  - - 8 1.17×107 1467 0.0472  - - 
10 1.16×107 1446  0.0469  - - 10 1.11×107 1381  0.0476  - - 
12 1.09×107 1365 0.0470  -  -  12 1.04×107 1304 0.0478  -  - 
15 1.02×107 1273 0.0469 -  -  15.5 9.66×106 1207 0.0477 -  - 
15 - - 0.0415  0.105  51  15.5 - - 0.042  0.108  52  
34 - - 0.0415 0.105  51 34 - - 0.042  0.108  52  
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8. Conclusions  
I have developed a new model that considers land-use of humans and wildlife creatures 
forming a food chain in a closed monocentric city adjacent to natural habitats. Technically, I 
have extended the work of Eichner and Pethig (2006) to the situation where carnivores 
encroach into the residential district. Indeed, when the city size expands, some species leave 
natural habitats to obtain food such as garbage because the available food would be 
decreased by the small size of natural habitats. The problem is that such species have both 
benefits and costs for humans: the conservation of species is important for biodiversity and 
maintaining the quality of ecosystem services, but they have a negative impact on humans if 
they are close to humans such as injury, infectious disease, and, in extreme cases, loss of life.  
Using the proposed model in this thesis, I have understood the equilibrium land use 
where residents and carnivores coexist in the city and how it causes market failures. The 
following general conclusions are worth pointing out. When carnivores encroach into a city, 
they stay longer time as they approach the CBD if the marginal benefit of getting foods with 
respect to distance is bigger than the marginal cost of being exterminated by humans. But, if 
the marginal cost becomes larger than the marginal benefit, then they stay shorter time as 
they approach the CBD, and the staying time finally reaches zero. I have proven that such 
equilibrium land use where carnivores use both residential lands and natural habitats 
uniquely exists. Since the time density of carnivores varies across the city, densities of 
conflicts also vary across the city. This theoretical explanation seems corresponding with real 
situations such as the encroachment by coyotes in the Denver Metropolitan Area (see Figure 
4 obtained from Poessel et al., 2013). The figure shows that densities of resident–coyote 
conflicts first become larger as they approach the city center, then they become smaller and 
reach zero. The current model can handle such spatially dependent externalities, but the 
previous two-discrete area model (e.g. Eichner and Pethig 2006, 2009) cannot handle these 
externalities.  
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Then, I have analyzed how the laissez-faire equilibrium land use in which humans and 
wildlife coexist in the city give rise to inefficient outcomes. To understand the effect of the 
coexistence within the city on biodiversity (i.e. the number of animals and plants), I consider 
the predator–prey interaction at each location within the natural habitat. the followings are 
main results. 
In the city, even if carnivores encroach into a city and its effect on humans is terrible, 
simply driving carnivores out of the city is inadequate. We have to tackle with this issue 
taking its effects on the number of herbivores through the food chain into consideration. For 
example, when the shadow price of herbivores is positive, the carnivores should stay longer 
in the city to make humans easily exterminate the carnivores’ offspring. This leads to 
increasing the number of herbivores and decreasing the number of carnivores. Similarly, the 
first-best optimal human population density depends on the shadow price of herbivores. In 
the situation where carnivores can easily get human-provided foods and humans want to 
increase the number of herbivores in terms of biodiversity, the optimal human population 
density should be smaller than the market equilibrium. Intuitively, this result indicates that 
we should make an interval between the city and the natural habitat like a buffer zone in 
which the human population density is low. By doing so, the number of carnivores declines 
because they cannot get human-provided foods, whereas the number of herbivores increases 
because the number of their predator animals decreases. 
In the natural habitat, I have shown that at the equilibrium, the time density of herbivores 
equals across the habitat, but the time density of carnivores depends on the plant density. 
Such spatial heterogeneity of predator–prey interactions generates inefficient outcomes in 
biodiversity. This result says that even if both carnivores and herbivores take best response to 
the other animal’s behavior, the predator–prey interaction is inefficient as long as the plant 
density is spatially heterogeneous. If the plant density is uniform across the habitat, the 
equilibrium time densities of both carnivores and herbivores are also uniform. At that time, 
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there are no externalities in the predator–prey interaction. This situation coincides with the 
two-discrete area model of Eichner and Pethig (2006, 2009). 
I have investigated how to deal with the trade-off between human–wildlife conflicts and 
biodiversity conservation by using land use policies in a second-best setting, that is, taking 
the households and wildlife behavior as given. I have two main results. First, in the situation 
where the encroachment of carnivores into the city has an adverse impact on humans, the 
shadow price of carnivores and herbivores can be either positive or negative depending on 
the degree of such negative externality. Second, the optimal city size can be larger or smaller 
than the laissez-faire equilibrium city size. In addition, I have numerically simulated the 
theoretical property. With regard to welfare gain, the urban boundary regulation obtains from 
38% to 60% of the first-best welfare gain, and the combination of UGB regulation and the 
plant density control obtains more than 90% of the first-best welfare gain. This result implies 
that when the city government imposes the urban boundary regulation, higher welfare gains 
can be obtained by optimally adjusting the plant density in the natural habitat.  
In addition to the optimal land use policies, I have investigated the optimal extermination 
policy as an alternative policy because in the real situation, the city government sometimes 
take extermination policy to tackle with the human–wildlife conflicts. I have obtain that 
when exterminating harmful carnivores in the city, we have to take into account not only the 
humans’ disutility but also the impacts of exterminating carnivores on the other species 
through the foods chain. The following question is my future tasks; (i) under what situation 
(for example, the cost of imposing land use policies is very high), which policies should the 
government choose, land use policies or extermination policies?; (ii) how much improve the 
social welfare by combining the extermination policy and the land use policies? 
In light of growing concern about the loss of biodiversity, many cities around the world 
try to make some policies in harmony with biological resources. On the other hand, 
human–wildlife conflicts, occurring due to the encroachment of wildlife into residential 
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areas, are a major obstacle to the harmonization. By integrating the simplest possible 
food-chain system with the traditional urban economics model in order to express complex 
but important spatial interactions between human and wildlife, I have provided a theory of 
equilibrium land use, a theory of optimal land use policies, and extermination policies for 
cities trying to live in harmony with biological resources. I hope these theories provide a 
fundamental role in designing various urban policies for the harmonization.  
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